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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that are currently under negotiation between 
the European Union (EU) and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) have been a cause of 
controversy.
1
This controversy surrounds the impact that the EPAs may have on development 
and on regional integration in Africa.
2
 The controversy comes up as a result of the way the 
EPA negotiating groups are configured. The configuration does not tally with the 
configuration of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. This has led to 
scepticism about the implications the EPAs will have on the regional integration that is being 
pursued by the RECs. The study focuses on the EPAs in the SADC region. 
 This chapter gives a background to the study, and specifically looks at how trade is 
regulated by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It looks at the provisions in the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) on the prescribed conduct of trade. It then discusses 
regionalism and special and differential treatment of developing countries as exceptions to 
the general GATT prescribed conduct of trade. It highlights the issues that the study focuses 
on and gives a layout of the chapters.  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
1.1.1Trade, Development and the GATT 
International trade is increasingly seen as an indispensable tool for development.
3
 The 
process of development is multifaceted 
4
 and has economic development as one of its facets.   
Economic development entails the   enhancement of the welfare of lives of people as it seeks 
to expand the wealth and opportunities that people have.
5
 Countries engage in international 
trade to promote their economic growth which is supposed to result in economic development 
and the eventual improvement of lives of their citizens.  
  Some of the aims of the WTO include the promotion of national welfare and 
prosperity of member States through the raising of living standards of people by ensuring the 
                                                          
1
 Percy F. Mukombe ‘Economic Partnership Agreements and SADC: The Controversy continues’  in Economic 
Justice Network of 27 September 2010. Available at http://www.ejn.org.za/index.php/ejn-on-the-move/ejn-on-
the-move-views/445-economic-partnership-agreement-and-sadc-the-controversy-continues. Accessed on 14 
January 2013. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Isabella D Bunn The Right to Development in International Economic Law (2012) 204. 
4
 Also enshrined in the concept of development are social, cultural and economic development. 
5


















The GATT, in its regulation of international trade, prescribes trade liberalisation as a 
means of promoting free trade through the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
between the GATT contracting parties. Trade liberalisation entails the opening up of markets 
through the removal of barriers to trade like tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Trade liberalisation is done at a multilateral level. Tariffs are to be applied on a non-
discriminatory basis on all like products on importation from or exportation to another 
contracting party.
7
 This is referred to as the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment. The 
MFN treatment is of general application but the GATT provides for exceptions to its 
application by allowing the formation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and Customs Unions 
(CUs), and special and differential treatment of developing countries.    
 FTAs are customs territories
8
 in which member States of the FTA do not apply tariffs 
to imports from member States but apply tariffs on imports from States outside the FTA. A 
CU is a customs territory in which there is no tariff applicable to imports from within the 
territory but member States of the CU apply a Common External Tariff (CET) to imports 
from non-member States of the CU. Products from the customs territory are treated 
differently from like products from outside the customs territory.  
The GATT allows for the special and differential treatment of developing countries 
taking into account the fact that developing countries cannot liberalise trade at the same rate 
as developed countries.  
1.1.2 Regional integration and participation in global trade 
Article XXIV of the GATT provides for the creation of FTAs and CUs. CUs are supposed to 
facilitate trade among members of a customs territory and not raise additional trade barriers 
to other countries which are not members of the customs territory.
9
 Trade facilitation between 
member States is done through trade liberalisation. 
                                                          
6
 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO Agreement) Preamble. 
7
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) article 1. 
8
 A customs territory is  a territory with respect to which separate tariffs and other regulations of commerce are 
maintained for a substantial part of trade of the territory with other territories. See GATT article XXIV (2). 
9














 In an FTA, members are supposed to reduce barriers to substantially all trade among 
them.
10
  The rationale behind trade liberalisation is that it enhances intra-regional trade and 




  According to Jacob Viner, FTAs and CUs could lead to the improvement of welfare 
in the countries involved through trade creation in the customs territory.
12
 CUs and FTAs are 
said to be capable of helping developing countries implement domestic reforms, open them 
up to competitive market pressure at a sustainable pace and facilitate their integration into the 
world economy.
13
  This is especially true for African RTAs
14
.  
Africa has lagged behind in both international trade and intra- regional trade
15
 and 
accounts for 3.7 per cent of exports and 3.1 per cent of imports globally
16
. These exports are 
usually raw materials and the imports comprise manufactured goods often made using raw 
materials exported from Africa since most countries on the continent do not have the capacity 
to transform most of its raw materials into secondary products.
17
  Africa also has the lowest 
intra-regional trade worldwide which is estimated at about 10 to 12 per cent.
18
  
In efforts to improve their participation in international trade, African States have 
embarked on regional integration schemes which have economic integration among their 
objectives. Trade integration is one of the aspects of economic integration. Among the 
primary goals of trade integration is the promotion of large-scale production with a view of 
shifting the trade pattern, from that of trading with external entities, to that of intra- regional 
                                                          
10
  GATT article XXIV (8). 
11
 Sean Woolfrey ‘Boosting intra-regional trade in Africa: An end in itself? (2012) 1 Bridges Africa Review 19. 
Available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges-africa-reviw/134375/.  Accessed on 27 November 2012. 
12
John McMillan ‘Does Regional Integration foster Open Trade? Economic Theory and GATT'S ARTICLE 




 According to Viner, an FTA is more beneficial if it is more trade creating than diverting. An FTA or CU is said 
to be trade creating if production moves to a relatively  more efficient producer in the customs territory  than to 
a more expensive producer  from within or outside the territory. 
13
James Thuo Gathii  African Regional Trade Arrangements as legal regimes (2011)  87. 
14
 SADC member States seek to collaborate in the development of different sectors  like energy and transport so 
as to build their capacity to produce and maximise economies of scale. www.sadc.int accessed on 29/08/12. 
15
 United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (UNECA), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV  
Enhancing Intra -African Trade (2010)  
16
 WTO World Trade Report 2012, Trade and public Policies : A closer look at non- tariff measures in the 21
st
 
century. Available at www.wto.org accessed on 28/08/12. 
17
 Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RIDSP) Available at www.sadc.int. 
18
















 It is believed that the savings in foreign exchange earnings would then build on the 
reserves that countries use to pay for imports from outside the continent. These savings 
would then be used to build trade capacity through industrialisation. The countries in the 




  Countries endeavour to cooperate in several areas and seek to promote industrial 
production and product diversification through specialisation, exploitation of economies of 
scale, coordinated programming and development of infrastructure. 
21
 The Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) pursues some of these goals. 
 The SADC common agenda has poverty eradication and the integration of the region 
into the global economy as its ultimate goal.
22
 The Regional I dicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) set economic integration and trade liberalisation as interventions 
for deeper integration and poverty reduction and lay down strategies for implementation of 
the SADC common agenda.
23
 The RIDSP takes a development approach to integration and 
spells out that all activities that will be undertaken should focus on the economic integration 
and the improvement of welfare of its people as its underlying goal. Guidelines on market 
integration aimed at promoting specialisation of production in the region have been set with 
time frames for the achievement of set goals.
24
 In essence, its ultimate objective is the 
realisation of the right to development of the people of the region. 
SADC is implementing a market integration approach to regional integration which 
involves a linear progression from an FTA to a common market.
25
 Member States are to 
liberalise trade in goods through the phased elimination of tariff and non –tariff barriers to 
trade. They have different tariff liberalisation schedules under the SADC Protocol on Trade.
26
 
                                                          
19
 Gathii op cit note 13 at 10. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Ibid at 21. 
22
  Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC Treaty) Article 5. 
23
 SADC The Regional Indicative Strategic Plan 23. Available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/104. 




 A common market is  a customs territory in which there is free movement of goods, and factors of production 
which include labour and capital.   
26
 Member States submitted their tariff phase down offers which form annexures to the Protocol on Trade. See 














The principle of variable geometry which allows liberalisation of tariffs at different rates 
based on the level of development of countries applies in the SADC region.
27
  
 The pace of economic integration in SADC has been slow and uneven.
28
 The SADC 
FTA was established in 2008 and a CU was supposed to be launched in 2010. However, this 
failed to take place and the REC is currently working towards the establishment of a CU by a 
date to be agreed on.
29
 Among the outstanding issues that need to be resolved are the 
differences in tariff liberalisation schedules and different rules of origin. 
SADC Member States that belong to other RECs have different tariff liberalisation 
schedules for the goods which they trade in. The issue of different tariff liberalisation 
schedules will have to be addressed before the region becomes a CU. The GATT requires 
elimination of duties with respect to substantially all trade between constituent territories of 
members of a customs territory prior to the formation of a CU.
30
 This issue will be discussed 
further in chapter 2. 
Goods have to comply with the SADC Rules of origin for them to be eligible for duty 
free importation into a territory of a member State. This is done in order to avoid the issue of 
transhipment where goods that originate from outside the FTA enter the region through a 
country with low import tariffs and eventually find themselves in a country with higher 
import tariffs. Since the goods are already in the customs territory, they might be mistaken 
for goods that originate from the region and be exempt from tariff application. This would 
defeat the purpose of having an FTA. The whole essence of market integration is to foster 
intraregional trade and support regional industries. This is not to imply that protectionism is 
encouraged in an FTA but since regional integration also seeks to build production capacity, 
goods originating from the region should be exempt from import tariffs while goods from 
outside the region are subject to tariff application on an MFN basis. 
The progression of regional integration in SADC becomes further complicated with 
the proposed Tripartite FTA (TFTA) with the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). The TFTA is still at negotiation stage 
                                                          
27
 The SADC Protocol on trade allows for member States to apply for extension on the time frames for tariff 
liberalisation. Developed countries in the region like South Africa, Namibia and Botswana have liberalised most 
tariffs. Other middle income countries are phasing down their tariffs gradually while in Least Developed 
Countries like Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, tariff reduction started around 2007-2008. www.sadc.int  
28
 Clement  Ng’ong’ola ‘The Legal framework for economic integration in the Southern African Development 
Community’ (2008)  8 U. Botswana L.J. 3 at 41. 
29
 www.sadc.int accessed on 29/0712 
30














but there a number of complex issues that need to be resolved like differences in rules of 
origin and tariff liberalisation schedules. The TFTA would solve the issue of multiplicity of 
REC membership but the issues of differences in tariff liberalisation schedules and different 
rules of origin, among others have to be resolved before the TFTA is established. 
1.1.3 The EU SADC trade relationship 
The Enabling Clause of 1979
31
 allows developed countries to grant preferential market access 
to imports from developing countries without granting the same treatment to other WTO 
members. In line with the Enabling Clause, the EU granted ACP States non reciprocal 
preferential market access under the Lomé conventions; however, the GATT panel in the EC 
bananas
32
 case ruled that this trade regime did not comply with the GATT.
33
 The EU then 
sought to change the trade relationship to one in which the Parties would grant each other 
reciprocal preferential market access under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA).  
In addition to regional integration efforts, SADC member States are negotiating EPAs 
with the EU. The EPAs are reciprocal trade regimes under which parties shall gradually 
liberalise trade between themselves. The EPAs aim to establish FTAs between the EU and 
African Regional groupings which comply with WTO law.
34
 Among the objectives of the 
EPAs is the fostering of economic integration of ACP States into the global economy and the 
support of regional integration.
35
  
The CPA designates ACP member States as parties to the EPAs
36
.  EPAs are being 
negotiated in regional groupings but ratification will be on a bilateral basis.
37
 There are 
currently Interim Economic Partnership Agreements (IEPAs) which aim to progressively 
liberalise trade on a reciprocal basis in the FTAs between the EU and regions in Africa.
38
 
                                                          
31
 The GATT Decision on Differential and more Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries of 1979. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_enabling_e.pdf. 
Accessed on 28 August 2012. 
32
 EEC – Member States Import Regimes for Bananas, DS32/R (1993). 
33
 The WTO Appellate Body held that the granting of preferential market access to only some developing 
countries without granting the same to others was in violation of the enabling clause. Furthermore, the EU could 
not justify its non-reciprocal granting of preferences under article XXIV of the GATT. 
34
 CPA  article 36. 
35
 CPA article 29. 
36
 CPA article 37. 
37
CPA article 35. 
38














Negotiation for full EPAs is on going and the deadline of 1 January 2014 for completion of 
negotiations has been recently extended to 2016.
39
   
 SADC member States are not negotiating the EPAS as one block. There are currently 
four EPA negotiating groups among the 15 member States of SADC. There is the East and 
Southern Africa (ESA) group which includes COMESA member States; the SADC - minus 
group
40
 which comprises SACU members including Angola, and South Africa joined in at a 
later stage; Tanzania belongs to the EAC group and the last group comprises member States 
that have not initialled the IEPAs.
41
    
As regards the ESA group, there are three sets of rules of origin that come into play, 
those under  SADC, COMESA and the ones that will be agreed on under the EPA. The 
existence of multiple rules applying to the same members complicates the regional 
integration process. It entails having to decide on a common set of rules if the integration 
process is to proceed. 
The configuration of the EPA negotiating groups raises questions of their 
compatibility with the market integration being pursued by SADC. This configuration has a 
potential to further complicate the progression of the SADC FTA to a CU. The complication 
comes in when one compares the rules of origin and the tariff liberalisation schedules under 
the IEPAs with those of SADC.  One of the concerns that have been raised is that countries 
belonging to the same REC may liberalise different baskets of products and so create new 
barriers to progression of market integration.
42
 Countries in a CU are supposed to have 
uniform tariffs applicable to imports to the region, the existence different tariffs applicable to 
EU imports would entail that countries have to harmonise tariffs applicable to the EU imports 
in addition to harmonisation of tariffs applicable to all other imports. This would delay the 
tariff harmonisation process which may slow down the progression of regional integration. 
 
                                                          
39
 Agritrade ‘EU calls for more time for EPA negotiations’ available at 
http://agritrade.cta.int/Agriculture/Topics/EPAs/EP-calls-for-more-time-in-EPA-negotiations. Accessed on 12 
January 2013. 
40
 This group comprises the Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland (BNLS). South Africa was 
incorporated at a later stage. 
41
 Sanoussi Bilal and Christopher Stevens The Interim Economic Partnership Agreements between the E.U and 
Africa States, Contents, challenges and prospects (2009) 164. 
42














1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
It has been argued that the reciprocity principle that is being pursued by the EPAs poses a 
threat to economic integration efforts in the RECs and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) projected that the resulting surge of European imports 
could displace intra-regional trade.
43
 This would run counter to regional integration efforts.  
It was initially understood that for EPAs to be pro-development, they have to support 
regional integration efforts in the ACP region.
44
 On the other hand, it is argued that the EPAs 
could help resolve the issue of overlapping memberships through the adoption of common 
tariff regimes by the different EPA groups.
45
 
The configuration of the EPA negotiating groups in SADC could add to the 
complexity of implementation of member States’ obligations under the SADC Treaty. In 
implementation of the obligations under the SADC and EPA trade regimes, one regime may 
be disadvantaged due to the implementation of the other. This could become further 
complicated when SADC is amalgamated into the proposed tripartite FTA with COMESA 
and EAC. 
1.2.1 Configuration of EPAs versus regional integration in SADC. 
The underlying question that this dissertation seeks to answer is whether the configuration of 
the EPAs in the SADC region counters the market integration being pursued in SADC. In 
particular, it examines – 
(a) whether the objectives of the CPA complement or counter those of the SADC treaty 
and relevant instruments on trade; 
(b) whether the configuration of the EPA groups counters the process of market 
integration in SADC; and 
(c) whether the CPA and  IEPAs  are flexible enough to accommodate the proposed 
incorporation of SADC into the proposed tripartite FTA. 
 
1. 3 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The dissertation has five chapters. 
                                                          
43
UNECA  op cit note 15 at 405. 
44
 ACP-EC Joint EPA Negotiations Joint report on the ACP –EC Joint Report of the First Dedicated Session on 


















Chapter 1 contains the introduction and lays down the background to the study. It 
states the research questions and gives the chapter outline.  
Chapter 2   lays the historical development of regional integration in SADC and lays 
the objectives of the SADC treaty, implementation and challenges encountered and new 
developments in the regional integration agenda of the region.  
Chapter 3 sets out a brief historical development of the EU and Africa trade 
relationship and narrows down this relationship to SADC. It lays down the objectives of the 
CPA and the implementation through the IEPAs. It also discusses the configuration of the 
IEPAs and trade liberalisation there under. 
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of whether the configuration of IEPAs is 
complementary or counter to integration in SADC. In particular, it discusses whether the 
CPA objectives complement those of the SADC Treaty. It also looks at whether the 
configuration of the SADC IEPA counters market integration in SADC as laid down in the 
RISDP. This is done through the examination of the trade liberalisation schedules and the 
rules of origin. Finally, it examines how flexible the CPA and the SADC-EU IEPA are to 
accommodate the proposed amalgamation of SADC with EAC and COMESA to form the 
TFTA. 
Chapter 5 contains the findings of the research questions and makes recommendations 
on how the issues may be addressed based on the analysis and conclusions arrived at in the 
chapters 1 to 4. It concludes that regional integration and the EPAs could be used as tools for 
development in the SADC region if member States coordinate their negotiating positions and 



















CHAPTER 2 – REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SADC 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines regional integration that is being pursued by SADC and looks at why 
the region is pursuing regional integration. It highlights the type of regional integration that is 
being pursued and the focus shall be on   economic integration in relation to trade in goods. 
This will be done through analysis of the objectives of the SADC Treaty. It discusses the 
progress made and the challenges the region is facing in implementation of these objectives. 
Some of the solutions being pursued by the REC to address these challenges shall be stated.  
The chapter argues that there is need for more concerted efforts and coordination 
among member States in meeting set targets of the integration process if the objectives of the 
SADC Treaty are to be achieved. Furthermore, the institutions that have been established 
under the treaty need to be more vigilant in ensuring that the regional integration plan of the 
region proceeds as planned. 
2.2 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
2.2.1 Economic Integration 
Economic integration is defined as a “state of affairs or process involving the combination of 
separate economies into larger economic regions. 
46
. National components function as an 
entity through the process of elimination of barriers between States.
47
  
Ostergaard laid down three classical models of economic integration namely market 
integration, development integration and neo functionalism.
48
 These models have distinct 
characteristics which often overlap in practice. The different models are pursued for different 
expected benefits and outcomes but common among them is the enlargement of market space 
and pursuit of development.
49
 
 The market integration model is centred on the elimination of barriers to trade among 
States so as to widen the market space for goods produced in the States involved.
50
 
Integration proceeds in linear stages from an FTA, CU, common market, economic 
community, monetary union and eventually to a political union in which there is a blend of 
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economic and political integration. In an FTA, States do not impose import duties on goods 
originating from member States. The next stage is a CU in which member States adopt a CET 
for goods imported from outside the region. This is followed by a common market, which is a 
deeper form of integration in which in addition to the free movement of goods; there is free 
movement of factors of production like labour and capital. In a monetary union a common 
currency is adopted.  A political union is the highest form of integration in which in addition 
to integration of economic spaces, there exists policy integration. Member States have 




 The development integration model focuses on the creation of productive capacity of 
the States pursuing integration and combines the theory of integration and development.
52
 It 
is characterised by the conscious efforts by States in a region in promoting cooperation and 
interdependence.
53
 Under this model, States do not necessarily combine their markets to 
expand the market for their goods; instead, they focus on building production capacity in the 
States involved.  
 In the neo functional model international cooperation is based on cooperation in areas 
of interest to the region like trade, transport, security of communication. Progress in 
cooperation is pushed by interest groups. It takes a sector by sector approach to cooperation 
and assumes the alienation of economics from politics. It is believed that once development 
of identified sectors is achieved then political cooperation will follow as a result of the need 
for an institution to manage the cooperation sectors. This model is was characteristic of 
development in Western Europe. 
54
  The absence or low numbers of interest groups in Africa 
leaves heads of state at the fore front when it comes to international cooperation.
55
 
 The model that best describes the integration being pursued in SADC is the market 
integration model. SADC member States are the ones that are in the forefront in seeking to 
cooperate and they are in the process of merging their markets through the linear progression 
from an FTA to an eventual common market. All this is done with the aim of developing the 
region. 
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2.2.2 Why Regional economic integration?  
African governments are using regional integration as a strategy to enhance the capacity of 
their small and fragmented economies, widen their economic space, and build industrial 
capacity to increase competiveness of their products in the global market to enhance the 
welfare of their people.
56
  
The exposure of domestic products to foreign products leads to improved capacity to 
compete which eventually leads to the transformation of goods.
57
 For example, producers of 
primary products will eventually move towards refining their outputs into secondary goods 
which will compete better in both   domestic and foreign markets. For example, where 
country X relies on production of oranges for export, the opening up of the economy will 
expose the domestic producers and consumers to a secondary product from oranges. In this 
case it could be orange juice. The fact that the domestic producers face competition from 
orange juice imports will motivate them to start producing orange juice and get more 
monetary value from the oranges rather than export them as merely fruits for consumption. 
This would then be a transformation of the domestic products which would lead to a diversity 
of outputs in the orange industry of country X. 
There is evidence of a co-relation between trade openness and economic growth since 
access to larger markets tends to increase the returns of economies of scale.
58
 It is believed 
that trade openness has accelerated the growth of the economies of industrialised countries 
and economies like India and China which have witnessed rapid growth since liberalisation 
of their markets.
59
 Economic integration has also been a success in the EU.  
In view of the economic integration that was taking place globally, it became apparent 




The trade situation in sub Saharan Africa is different from that of Western Europe 
where about 63 per cent of trade takes place intra regionally.
61
 The low level of intra African 
trade has had a negative impact on specialisation and industrial production. Sub Saharan 
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African countries produce similar goods and have relatively few goods to trade among 
themselves. For example most of them are producers of similar agricultural products like 
maize, cotton, tobacco, and some produce minerals like copper and gold which are mostly 
destined for Europe.
62
 Regardless of the foreign exchange earnings from these exports, there 
has not been significant economic development.  These foreign exchange earnings are usually 
expended on paying for imports which are usually secondary products processed from the 
exported materials and other manufactured products that the region does not process due to 
lack of capacity.  
  The lack of industrialisation and lack of diversity of manufactured goods to offer to 
regional markets remains an obstacle to increased intra-regional trade.
63
 The imports to the 
region are mainly capital and intermediate goods. 
64
 South Africa and Zimbabwe produce 
most of the capital and intermediate goods in the region.  The region produces significant 
amounts of metals and minerals for export which form a high percentage of global 
production.  For example, 49 per cent of the world’s platinum and 36 per cent of gold come 
from the region. There is therefore potential for investment and economic growth. The 
concentration of industrialisation in few countries has had an impact on the development of 
the region whose members are at different economic levels.
65
   
It has been stated that due to their small economies, economic development within 
Africa will be better attained through the unity of economic spaces among African States.
66
    
This leads us then to the regional integration that is being pursued in Southern Africa. 
2.2.3 SADC 
 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) preceded SADC 
and was established through a Memorandum of Understanding in 1980 among the frontline 
States.
67
 The main goal of this coordination was to detach the region from economic 
dependence on the apartheid South Africa and to coordinate pro development activities to 
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enhance economic liberation of the region.
68
  Trade liberalisation was not among the 
objectives of SADCC. 
  Most of the programmes that were set under the SADCC Programme of Action were 
not achieved due to financial and capacity constraints. The programmes were headed by 
States which were expected to foot the costs of implementation. Due to underdevelopment 
and low levels of funding, the programmes depended on donor funding.
69
  Its minimal 
success was also based on its weak legal framework and institutional set up.
70
  
 The success of regional integration in Europe influenced the establishment of the 
African Economic Community (AEC) which prescribes market integration as a mode of 
formation of the community.
71
 If SADCC was to be part of the grand plan of the continent, it 
had to incorporate market integration in its integration process. Furthermore, factors such as 
the economic situation in the region showed that it was more practical to include South 
Africa as the hub of the process of integration.
72
  
   The Windhoek declaration of 1992
73
  expanded the integration agenda to include 
trade in goods. Trade liberalisation was not the main objective of integration in itself but it is 
used as a strategy to attract investment to increase trade in the region and international 
markets.
74
  The objective of the region shifted from reducing dependence on South Africa to 
cooperation for development of the region.
75
 The objective of the transformation was to 
broaden integration to address the problems facing the region which was lagging behind in 
trade with its heavy reliance on trade in primary products.
76
 With the increase in 
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competitiveness of trade globally, it became imperative for the region to enhance its trade 
capacity.  
SADCC member States could not do this individually and took a cooperation 
approach which became legally binding under the SADC Treaty. The institutional framework 




2.2.4 SADC in pursuit of market integration 
The SADC Treaty came into operation in 1992 and is premised on the Windhoek declaration 
of 1992 which called upon the people of Southern Africa to develop a vision of a shared 
future within a regional community to ensure the improvement of the quality of life of its 
people among other things.
78
 
The underscoring objective of the SADC Treaty is the deepening of integration and 
promotion of cooperation in various sectors ranging from agriculture, energy and trade to 
reduce dependence on exports of a few primary products.
79
  
2.2.5 The SADC Common Agenda 
Article 5 of the SADC treaty forms the common Agenda of SADC and calls for the 
promotion of sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio economic development 
that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication through 
regional integration.
80
 It seeks to promote self-sustaining development on the basis of 
collective self-reliance and interdependence of member States. The Treaty provides for 
maximisation of utilisation of resources in the region and calls for complementarity between 
national and regional strategies and programmes. In order to achieve this, member States are 
to harmonise their political and socio economic policies and plans and participate fully in the 
implementation of plans and projects of SADC.
81
  
Member States undertook to promote the achievement of the objectives of SADC and 
refrain from taking measures that are likely to jeopardise application of principles laid down 
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by the SADC Treaty.
82
 They are to take steps towards the uniform application of the 
provisions of the Treaty.
83
 
 Member States are to cooperate in all areas necessary to foster regional development 
and integration
84
 and coordinate their macroeconomic policies and strategies, programmes 
and projects in trade, industry, finance, just to mention a few. Member States are empowered 
under article 22 to conclude Protocols spelling out the objectives, scope and institutional 
framework for cooperation in the various sectors of cooperation identified. 
2.2.6 Institutional set up 
The SADC Treaty sets up institutions to oversee the implementation of the SADC common 
agenda.  
The SADC Summit is the supreme policy making institution of SADC. It constitutes 
Heads of State and is responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions 
of SADC.
85
 The Summit has the mandate to adopt legal instruments for implementation of 
the Treaty under article 22.  
 The Council comprises Ministers responsible for foreign affairs and is responsible for 




 The Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) oversees the core areas of integration 
which include trade, industry, finance and investment. The ICM also monitors and controls 
the implementation of the RISDP.
87
  The ICM gives policy direction to the SADC Secretariat 
and has powers to create committees that are necessary to cater for cross cutting sectors.
88
 
 The SADC Secretariat is the principle executive organ of the REC and is responsible 
strategic planning of SADC programmes.
89
 It is supposed to monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of regional policies and programmes.
90
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 These institutions have the mandate to ensure that regional integration which includes 
trade liberalisation goes in accordance with the instruments that guide the process.  
2.2.7 Trade liberalisation 
The SADC Protocol on Trade 
The SADC Protocol on Trade was signed in 1996 and came into force in 2000 with 
liberalisation of intra-regional trade in goods as its main objective.
91
 It seeks to further 
liberalise intra-regional trade, advance economic development, diversification, and 
industrialisation and establish an FTA. 
 The Trade Protocol provides guidelines for trade liberalisation and takes into account 
the different levels of economic development of SADC member States.
92
 It provides for the 
phased elimination of import duties on goods originating from SADC member States.
93
 
Liberalisation of intra-regional trade in goods and services is to be on the basis of fair, 
mutually beneficial and equitable trade arrangements which will ensure efficient productivity 
of industries within SADC and contribute towards the investment climate of the region.
94
 
 Trade liberalisation is to be determined by the Committee of Ministers responsible for 
trade having regard to existing preferential trade arrangements.
95
 Trade liberalisation was to 
be achieved within a time frame of 8 years from the entry force of the Protocol.
96
  
 Export duties are not to be applied to goods destined for another member state within 
the region and technical barriers to trade are to be eliminated.
97
 There are to be no 
quantitative export and import restrictions.
98
 There is to be national treatment of goods 
originating from the region.
99
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Member States may enter into trade relationships with other countries outside the 
region as long as they do not conflict with the provisions of the Protocol.
101
 Member States 
are to coordinate trade policies and negotiating positions with respect to relations with third 
countries.
102
   
The Protocol provides for the phased implementation of tariff liberalisation. 
103
 
Member States made two sets of offers for phasing down of tariffs: one set applies to the 
region in general and the other to South Africa which is the most developed country in the 
region.
104
.   
Rules of origin 
Rules of origin are important for the determination of goods that are eligible for preferential 
treatment.
105
The SADC Rules of Origin are contained in Annex 1 of the Protocol on Trade.   
Goods are accepted as originating from the region if they have been wholly produced 
in a member State or incorporate materials from another member State.
106
 If they are not 
wholly produced in a member State, they should have undergone sufficient working process 
in a member State.
107
 Mere assembling, packaging, dilution or any other process that does not 
affect the character or composition of goods does not suffice to make goods originate from a 
member State.
108
 This means that goods that originate from third States will be subject to 
tariffs applicable in respective member States. 
The RISDP 
The RISDP provides strategic direction to SADC plans and objectives. It aligns the strategic 
objectives and activities with policies to be achieved within a fifteen year period.
109
 It is 
indicative in nature meaning it is not legally binding.
110
   
                                                          
101
 Ibid Article 28. 
102
 Ibid Article 29. 
103
 Ibid article 3. 
104
 Dirk Hanshom Willie Breytenbach Trudi Hartzenberg (Eds) Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern 
Africa Year book Vol 4 (2004) 20. 
105
 Henry Kibet Mutai ‘Regional Trade integration strategies in SADC and EAC’ (2011) 1 SADC LJ 81 at 85. 
106
 SADC Rules of Origin Rule 2(1). 
107
  Ibid  Rule 2 (2).  
108
 Ibid Rule 3. 
109
 SADC  Regional Indicative Strategic Plan  para 1.6 available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf. Accessed on 
29 August 2012. 
110
 Tralac The Regional Indicative Strategic Plan, How is SADC doing? (2012)  2. Available at www.tralac.org 














The RISDP takes into account the resource constraints of the region and provides for 
a flexible approach towards integration and implementation of objectives of the treaty.
111
 
Trade liberalisation is to proceed on a variable geometry approach which accommodates the 
different levels of development of member States.
112
 Its ultimate goal is the promotion of 
sustainable and equitable growth of member States of the region. It seeks to enhance 
competitiveness of the region through diversification of production structures and export 




The RIDSP builds on the provisions of the Protocol on Trade which provides for only 
the establishment of an FTA. It set a time table for integration through the following 
progressive stages: an FTA to be established by 2008, a CU by 2010, a Common Market by 
2015, an economic Community with a central bank by 2016 and the development of a 
common currency by 2018.
114
 
Chapter four of the RISDP lays down the targets in the trade, finance and investment 
sector to be achieved within stipulated time frames. Members undertook to phase down tariffs 




2.3 PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
2.3.1 Progress 
 In its 22 years of existence, SADC has made substantial progress in regional 
integration.   
 The SADC Summit mandated the carrying out of a desk top survey in 2011 to 
monitor the progress made on trade liberalisation in the region to find the challenges being 
met and propose solutions to these challenges.
116
  
According to the key findings of the desktop research, much progress has been made 
in the implementation of the set targets the most significant being the establishment of the 
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FTA in 2008 when 85 per cent of flow of trade in goods within the region attained duty free 
status.
117
12 members are currently participating in the FTA
118
. There still remains the phasing 
down of tariffs on sensitive products. As of January 2012, the phase down was largely 
complete with the completion of the tariff phase down on sensitive products.
119
 
A CU was to be launched in 2010 however, this did not take place. The launch of the 
CU awaits the resolution of some of the challenges that are being faced in the region. 
2.3. 2 Challenges  
The challenges facing regional integration in SADC are three dimensional. They are 




 Historically, the challenge lay in the lack of coherent policy guidelines for the 
integration process. The RIDSP provides a road map for integration however, it is merely 
indicative.  Sovereignty stands in the way of integration, with member States undertaking to 
fulfil objectives that eventually are either not implemented or take long to be implemented. 
National priorities take precedence over regional ones. It is inevitable that there will be a 
clash between national priorities and those of the region due to the varying levels of 
development in the countries of the region. States can only meaningfully participate in the 
integration process when they have the capacity to integrate their economies with those of 
others.  There still remains a need to align national policies with those of the region.  
 This leads to the next challenge which is related to the nature of the legal obligations 
in the SADC Treaty.  Some of the provisions are ambiguous. One of the impacts of ambiguity 
has been the proliferatio  of multiplicity of membership of States in other RECs. For 
example, Article 27 of the Treaty does not preclude States from entering into new trade 
agreements with third parties.  One might be tempted to question whether the region is really 
seeking deeper integration while allowing for the entry into other similar agreements which 
although may not contradict the provisions of the treaty, may have the effect of slowing down 
the integration process.   
A CU was initially set to be established in 2010 but failed to take place.  Despite the 
launch of the FTA, some countries still lag behind in the implementation of their 
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commitments under the Trade Protocol. For example, Malawi is still at the phase down 
commitment level it had as at 2004.
121
  Tanzania got an extension to extend application of 
tariffs on sugar and paper products until 2015; Zimbabwe was given a derogation to extend 
its phase down obligations until 2014.
122
 This is just to cite a few examples of the lack of 
uniformity of implementation of obligations.  
 The RoO have been stated to be very complex and a hindrance to intra SADC trade.
123
 
A mid-term review conducted in 2004 called for the review of the RoO which were amended 
by 2008; however, they are yet to be implemented by member States. 
 Harmonisation of Customs Rules and procedures has proven to be very complex over 
the years and this has had an impact on the flow of goods in the region. States have varying 
systems of customs procedures. The Committee of Ministers adopted the SADC Model Act 
in 2007 to act as a blue print for the Customs Acts of member States.
124
 A common Tariff 
Nomenclature, Transit Management System and a SADC single administration document 
have been developed.
125
 This is a step in the right direction towards harmonisation of 
policies; however, since these developments are fairly new, the impact is yet to be seen. 
 The failure to launch the CU by 2010 has been a result of the above mentioned 
challenges. Preparations for launching a CU date back to 2006.
126
 There is supposed to be in 
place a CET for the region to proceed from an FTA to a CU. The delay in phasing down of 
tariffs and the multiplicity of membership of member States in other RECs meant that the CU 
could not be created before these challenges were addressed.
127
 In the linear progression of 
market integration, the full implementation of one stage triggers the move to the next stage.
128
 
The CU can only be launched when the FTA is fully implemented with all member States 
participating in it. 
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Another problem relates to the difficulty in harmonising the customs policies of 
member States. This is one of the problems that sovereignty brings as member States would 
each like to determine what policies work for their respective countries. The adoption of a 
single tariff nomenclature would entail giving up their national industrial policies and giving 
up some of their sovereignty.
129
 The issue of upholding sovereignty of member States is one 
of the underlying principles of the Treaty.
130
 This brings a clash between the underlying 
principles of the Treaty and the implementation of the obligations it lays down. The Treaty 
advocates for upholding State sovereignty and yet the obligations like trade liberalisation and 
policy harmonisation are supposed to be implemented within a stipulated time frame to 
ensure the progression of regional integration. States cannot be left to determine their own 
pace of implementation of obligations under the Treaty. Their policy space is not very wide if 
they are part of a regional integration scheme. States have to factor in regional integration 
efforts when formulating national policies in sectors like trade which have a bearing on the 
progression of regional integration.    
Another challenge that remains to be addressed relates to the fact that there already 
exists a CU in the SADC region. The rest of the members outside SACU would have to come 
to the level of SACU if a CET applicable to the region is to be formulated.
131
 On the other 
hand, it could be considered as an advantage, since it would serve as a starting point for the 
formulation of the CET. 
Regarding the formulation of the CET, the Summit has to decide whether the CET 
will be used to protect the region from foreign competition or whether it should be low so as 
to help facilitate the integration of the region into the global economy.
132
  
The Summit announced in 2010 that the establishment of the CU would have to be 
postponed. A High level expert group was set up to consolidate work on the establishment of 
the future CU and come up with a proposed model of the CU to be established. As of March 
2012, a report of the work of the expert group was submitted to the Council of Ministers.
133
 
The recommendations can only be implemented when approved by the SADC summit. 
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 Trade relations with countries from outside the region raise another complication in 
the progression of market integration. This relates to both south-south relationships and north 
south relationships. Regarding the south-south relationships, there is overlapping membership 
of RECs. Some SADC member States are also members of COMESA and this is an issue that 
should be resolved before the FTA progresses into a CU. The overlapping membership 
creates a duplication of efforts in the integration process and further complicates the 
attainment of the CU. This is because members in the different RECs have different tariff 
phase down schedules and different RoO.
134
 In an attempt to resolve this issue of multiplicity 
of membership of RECs, COMESA, EAC and-SADC resolved to merge and form a tripartite 
FTA which will eventually lead to the formation of a CU.
135
 Negotiations are still underway. 
The launch of the FTA will address the issue of failure to trade as a block which has had 
negative impacts on integration and development of the region. 
 The north- south relationship involves the negotiation of EPAs with the EU. SADC 
member States are negotiating the EPAs into two groups. There are currently IEPAs in place 
and as of March 2012, none of the groups had completed the negotiating process.
136
 Chapter 
3 discusses the relationship between the EU and SADC regarding the EPAs. 
 Inherent in all the challenges highlighted is the problem of capacity constraints to 
implement the obligations laid down by the SADC treaty. This has resulted in the failure or 
delayed implementation of regional integration obligations. In addition to this is the lack of 
an effective monitoring mechanism over the integration process. It has been proposed that 
SADC should establish an effective implementation and monitoring mechanism that will hold 
member States accountable for failure to implement undertakings that have been made at the 
regional level.
137
 The lack of implementation of obligations has characterised the integration 
process in the region.
138
  
The RIDSP has been criticised for setting ambitious and unrealistic targets and hence 
it is not guaranteed that the implementation will be to the letter.
139
 This criticism is based on 
the evaluation of the progress made between 2005 and 2010. It is proposed that since it is a 
flexible document, there is need to revise the targets and set more realistic deadlines. 
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2.3.3 Political will for integration versus implementation of Treaty obligations 
The major question that arises is whether SADC member States have the political will to 
pursue the integration process further than political commitments that have been made at the 
regional level. 
 Research has shown that there is a mismatch between the regional integration and 
individual state’s economic ambitions which is reflected in the slow implementation of 
obligations under the Treaty and their pursuit of trade relations with third parties.
140
  For 
example, the member States agreed to launch the CU by 2010, however, the tariff phase 
down is still on going. While they are implementing treaty obligations, they are also 
negotiating EPAs which have different tariff liberalisation schedules to those under SADC. 
This issue will be discussed further in chapter 3. These variations are indicative of the fact 
that SADC member States do not share economic common interests. Under the Trade 
Protocol, member States are to harmonise their policies and negotiating positions when it 
comes to relations with third countries. 
Difficulty on measuring implementation progress due to lack of appropriate data from 




The protocol on trade has provisions which ensure that regional integration is not 
frustrated. Article 27 provides for the entry into trade arrangements with non members of the 
region but calls for member States to ensure that the arrangements are consistent with the 
Trade Protocol. This obligation is misplaced, should have been given to the institutional 
mechanisms like the cou cil of Ministers. Article 29 calls for coordination of trade policies 
and cooperation in relations with third countries. There is a need to ensure that article 29 is 
upheld when it comes to member States relations with third States. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
SADC evolved from SADCC and is pursuing the market integration model of economic 
integration in order to address the problem of marginalisation of the region in the global trade 
arena.  The SADC Treaty provides for the deepening of integration through increased trade 
liberalisation and harmonisation of economic policies. Institutions have been set up to ensure 



















implementation of the Treaty. The RISDP drew a road map for implementation of the 
objectives of the Treaty.  
An assessment of progress that has been made in its 22 years of existence shows that 
in general, much progress has been made in trade liberalisation with the launch of the FTA in 
2008. Despite the progress made, there are several historical, legal and implementation issues 
that need to be addressed which are delaying the establishment of the CU. A number of steps 
are being taken to address these issues; however, there is need for an effective 
implementation and monitoring mechanism to ensure States implement their obligations.  For 
the region to deepen integration there is need to harmonise activities of member States 
especially relating to trade relations with third States.  Furthermore, the SADC institutions 
ought to be more vigilant in exercising their mandate of ensuring that regional integration 















CHAPTER 3 – THE EU AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The trade relationship between Europe and southern Africa spans over a fifty year period. 
The EU has given preferential market access to African commodities. This chapter looks at 
why the EU gives preferential market access to African commodities and how the trade 
relationship has evolved over the years. 
The chapter lays down the WTO rules on trade regarding developing countries and 
then looks at the regulatory framework that has governed the EU and Africa trade 
relationship. It briefly discusses the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. The provisions relating 
to trade as laid down in the currently amended CPA will be discussed to show how the 
relationship has evolved. It discusses the IEPAs and highlights the challenges that are being 
met.  
The chapter discusses the negotiating groups in SADC and the IEPAs in the region 
with focus on the SADC IEPA. It briefly looks at the ESA IEPA because some SADC 
member States belong to this group. 
The main argument advanced   is that there is a need for more coordination of policies 
and negotiating positions between SADC member States. This will enable them to have 
common positions when negotiating trade agreements with third States and therefore 
strengthen regional integration. 
3.2 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 
International trade is supposed to be carried out on an MFN basis within the WTO context.
142
 
Since not all countries are at the same level of economic development, there was a need to 
take into account the differences in levels of economic development of the GATT contracting 
parties in implementation of obligations under the WTO. 
143
 For this reason, international 
trade law makes provision for the different treatment of developing countries. 
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3.2.1 Special and differential treatment of developing countries 
(a) The WTO Agreement  
The WTO Contracting Parties recognised that their relations in the field of trade and 
economics should be conducted with a view of raising the living standards of people and 
expanding the production of trade in goods.
144
 They further recognised the need for positive 
efforts to ensure that developing countries secure a share in world trade commensurate with 
the development needs of their economies.
145
 In pursuit of goals which would be mutually 
advantageous to their trade relationships, the contracting parties adopted the WTO 
Agreement. These aspirations are also reflected inter alia in the GATT. 
(b) The GATT 
The original GATT text of 1947 did not contain provisions for the special treatment of 
developing countries. Part IV on trade and development was subsequently included in 
1965
146
  and makes provision for the special treatment of developing countries. It recognises 
that there is a need for positive efforts which are to be designed to ensure that the less 
developed contracting parties secure a share in the growth of international trade while taking 
into account their economic and development needs.
147
  Since most of the less developed 
contracting parties depend on the exportation of primary products, developed countries are to 
provide market access for these products.
148
  
 One of the main features of this preferential treatment is the element of non-
reciprocity.  In granting preferential treatment to less developed countries, developed 
countries do not expect reciprocity from less developed countries.
149
 In carrying out their 
obligations, developed countries are to accord high priority to the removal or reduction of 
barriers to products originating from less developed countries.
150
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(c) The Enabling Clause 
The Contracting Parties waived the application of the MFN principle in1971 for a period of 
ten years in order to allow the operation of the Generalised system of Preferences (GSP).
151
  
The waiver allowed for developed countries to accord preferential tariff treatment to products 




The adoption of the Enabling clause in1979 provided the legal basis for the unilateral 
granting of preferences by developed countries to all developing countries.  There was thus 
no need for developed countries to seek permission from the contracting parties to grant 
preferential treatment to developing countries.
153
 This was to be done through the GSPs in 
order to facilitate trade in developing countries and respond positively to development, 
financial and trade needs of the developing countries.
154
. The contracting parties 
acknowledged the fact that with time, the situation of less developed countries would change 
and that they would ultimately reach a position which would enable them to participate more 
fully in the framework of the GATT.
155
   However, it ought to be noted that preferential 
treatment that is available to only a few developing countries is not covered under the 
Enabling clause.
156
 This issue will be discussed under the section that discusses the EC 
Bananas cases. 
3.3 THE EVOLVING TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND AFRICA  
The trade relationship between the EU and Africa has evolved through the years. The legal 
framework regulating this relationship has been responsive to the changes in Africa and the 
global context at large.
157
   
(a) From Yaoundé to Cotonou 
The relationship between the EU and the ACP countries dates back to 1957 when the 
European Common Market was established under the Treaty of Rome. The objective of the 
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Treaty was to eventually establish a common market among the European countries.
158
 This 
would have resulted in complications in the granting of preferences to overseas territories 
with which some members had colonial ties. For example, when the common market was 
established, there would be applied a CET to all imports into the region inclusive of imports 
from former colonies. 
At the insistence of France, Part IV was added into the Treaty and it formed the legal 
basis for the granting of preferential treatment to imports from former colonies. The customs 
duties applicable to imports from former colonies and other countries with a special 
relationship with the European countries were supposed to be progressively abolished 




 The trade relationship has since been regulated by several conventions from the 
Yaoundé I to the CPA.  
The Yaoundé Agreements preceded the Lomé Conventions and were aimed at 
fostering economic cooperation between the European Common Market and the Associated 
African and Malgache Countries (EAMA).
160
 These agreements created an aid and trade 
regime which granted goods from former European colonies free market access to the 
European market.
161 
The joining of Britain into the European Economic Community led to 
the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1975 between the Community and ACP States. 
(b) The Lomé Conventions 
The Lomé Conventions span from Lomé I to Lomé IV and incorporated trade as a tool for 
development.
162
  Under these conventions, trade preferences were given to imports of 
bananas, sugar, beef and veal from the ACP countries. After Lomé IV, the Protocol on 
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The EU continued with the system of unilateral preferential treatment of ACP States 
under the Lomé Convention until the EC Bananas case when the trade relationship came 
under scrutiny.  
The EEC Bananas Cases
164
 
The EEC maintained a common 20 per cent ad valorem
165
 tariff on banana imports. Under 
Protocol 5 of the Lomé Convention, the EC granted preferential market access to ACP 
banana imports.  Individual European countries maintained national restrictions on banana 
imports from non ACP countries.
166
 
The complaint in this case related to the imposition of restrictions on imports of 
bananas from Latin America. The complainants
167
 alleged violations of the MFN principal. 
The complainants argued that the application of the 20 per cent ad valorem duty to non ACP 
members was a violation of the MFN principle since ACP like products were admitted duty 
free .They claimed that the EC could not discriminate between developing countries when 
granting preferential market access.  
The EC argued that it could grant preferential market access to the ACP suppliers 
under article XXIV of the GATT. The EC argued that since this arrangement had gone 
unchallenged by the contracting Parties of the GATT after they had been notified of the 
arrangement, the complainants could not contest the arrangement. Furthermore, no notice to 
modify the Lomé convention had been given to the EU by the contracting Parties. The EC 
stated that if reciprocity was required, it would then be impossible to create an FTA between 
developed and developing countries.
168
 The EC argued that in accordance to part IV of the 
GATT, taking into account their development needs, it had accorded preferential market 
access to ACP countries.
169
  
The GATT Panel ruled that the granting of preferences to banana imports from ACP 
countries and not to other developing countries could not be justified under article XXIV. 
The Lomé Convention did not require reciprocity of granting of preferential market access 
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from the ACP States.
170
 The lack of obligation on the part of the ACP States to eliminate 
trade barriers made this trade regime different from that of an FTA envisaged under article 
XXIV.
171
 The preferences were granted on a unilateral basis because the EC did not expect 
the ACP States to reciprocate the market access preference. The EC could not therefore raise 
Article XXIV as a defence. In this case, the EC granted the preferences to ACP States only 
without granting the same preference to non ACP States. This was held to be a violation of 
the MFN principle.  
The EC then sought a GATT/WTO waiver to allow it to continue granting preferences 
to the ACP States. The waiver was granted in 1994 and was to expire in 2000.
172
The parties 
to the Lomé Conventions sought to make their relationship WTO compliant and this resulted 
in into the CPA in 2000. The EU maintained that the non-reciprocal trade relationship had not 
produce satisfactory results because the ACP countries underperformed in comparison to 






The Agreement altered the relationship between the ACP countries and the EU by 
introducing the concept of reciprocity in granting of preferential market access of goods 
traded between the parties. It formed a new framework for trade and development 
cooperation and is said to be the largest financial and political north-south cooperation.
174
  
 The parties to the Agreement committed themselves to working together to eradicate 
poverty, achieve sustainable development and ensure the integration of the ACP countries 
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into the global trading economy.
175
 The CPA aims to support regional integration efforts in 
trade and investment that will eventually lead to the integration of the ACP region into the 
world economy.
176
   
The original actors in the Agreement were the ACP States and the EU.  In the 
amended version of 2010, the actors now include regional and sub-regional organisations, the 
AU and non-State actors. 
177
 It should also be noted from the outset that the meaning of 
regional organisation is not provided. 
The ACP countries are to determine their own economic principles and objectives and 
models of their economies. The parties shall pay due regard to the political choices of the 
ACP States which are to formulate cooperation programmes together with the EU.
178
 The 
political dialogue between the parties is to be geared towards retaining the concept of 
multilateralism while upholding the objectives of regional and continental integration. The 
objectives are to be pursued through strategies that are locally owned and among other things, 
aimed at promoting regional cooperation and integration.
179
 
 The EU is to support the participation of LDCs in regional integration efforts and 
mitigate the cost implications of trade liberalisation.
180
  
The ultimate objective of trade cooperation is poverty reduction, sustainable 
development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.
181
 
This is to be done through the support of regional integration goals that are already being 
pursued among the ACP countries.
182
 In supporting these efforts, the cooperation shall build 
the production, supply and trading capacity of the ACP countries to reduce their dependence 
on primary products and promote more diversified economies. 
183
The cooperation shall be in 
full conformity with the prevailing WTO rules and shall take cognisance of the mutual 
                                                          
175
  Partnership Agreement between the African Caribbean, Pacific Group of States on the one part and the EU 
and its member States on the other part (CPA). Preamble. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/documents/devco-cotonou-consol-europe-aid-2012_en.pdf. 
176
 CPA article 1. 
177
 Ibid article 6(1) (b). 
178
Ibid article 4. 
179
Ibid article 20 (1) (aa). 
180
 Ibid article 29 
181
 Ibid article 19. 
182
















interests of the parties. 
184
  Due regard shall also be had to preference erosion which is in 
conformity with multilateral commitments under the WTO.
185
 
 The partnership is to take into account the different levels of development and needs 
of the ACP countries and give special and differential treatment to LDCs.
186
   
The CPA shall take precedence where there is an inconsistency with another 
Agreement that may exist between any of the parties.
187
 
The CPA shall be in force for 20 years from 1 January 2000 and is subject to review 
every five years with a possibility of amendment. The CPA has so far undergone two reviews 
in 2005 and 2010. The current text that is under consideration is the version that incorporates 
the 2010 amendments. 
(b) The EPAs  
EPAs aim at progressive trade liberalisation between the EU and ACP countries to create 
FTAs making the trade relationship more WTO compatible.
188
 This is aimed at the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries in the world economy by making use of the already existing 
regional integration schemes and south-south trade.  
The EU shall negotiate EPAs with ACP countries that consider themselves capable to 
negotiate and at the level that they consider appropriate to do so. 
189
 The negotiations are to 
be in accordance with the procedures agreed on with the ACP group with a view to 
supporting regional integration efforts. Market access of the ACP products into the EU is to 
be improved through the review of RoO.
190
  
The negotiations are to take into account the socio economic impacts that trade 
liberalisation may have on the ACP countries and their capacity to adjust their economies 
during the liberalisation process. In light of these issues, the negotiation process is supposed 
to be flexible in establishing sufficient transition periods and product coverage in the trade 
agreements.
191
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Once ACP States have concluded the EPAs with the EU, the ACP countries that are 
not party to the Agreements can accede to the EPAs at any time.
192
 
3.4 EPA NEGOTIATIONS 
(a) EPA negotiating groups  
Negotiations of EPAs were launched in Brussels on 27 September 2002
193
 and were to be 
completed by 2008. 
Negotiations are pursued with countries that consider themselves in a position to do 
so with the aim of supporting regional integration efforts.
194
  The CPA did not lay down the 
negotiating fora for ACP countries. ACP countries were to decide their negotiating forum 
which was to be a political decision based on economic analysis and clear criteria.
195
  This 
was to be done through the conduct of regional studies and mobilisation of political forces to 
come up with common negotiating positions.
196
   
ACP Position 
Initially, the ACP States were supposed to come up with the preferred negotiating scenario by 
2001.
197
 The ACP developed guidelines
198
 for the negotiation of EPAs which set the 
approach to be taken and principles that were to guide the negotiations. The guidelines lay 
down specific and general objectives to be pursued by the negotiating groups.  
 The guidelines noted that the EPA negotiations entailed building negotiating capacity 
and analytical capacity to assess the impacts that trade liberalisation would have on the ACP 
region, regional groupings and at national level.
199
 
 The ACP proposed negotiating the EPAs in two phases.
200
Phase 1 would be at an all 
ACP-EU level for the parties to agree on the objectives, scope and content, special and 
differential treatment, modalities and phasing of negotiations and implementation issues, 
financing and cost of adjustment and principles of the EPAs and issues of general concern to 
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 Phase 2 would be negotiation between the EU and regional groupings or 
individual countries in order for country specific issues to be taken into account.
202
 Issues for 
discussion under this phase included tariff negotiations and any other sectoral commitments 
at country or regional level.
203
   
The ACP countries were to be guided by the principles of unity and solidarity in their 
approach to the EPA negotiations which them to secure a better deal with the EU than if they 
were to negotiate the EPAs individually.
204
 Under the Lome trade regime, the ACP 




The EPAs were to build on regional integration initiatives in the region
206
  and not 
undermine them. The guidelines highlighted the fact that the ACP States were also involved 
in regional integration among themselves. The guidelines proposed that in order to ensure 
that the integration efforts are not undermined, regional integration should take precedence 
over any trade liberalisation commitments with the EU under EPAs.
207
 On the issue of 
flexibility, the ACP States were to be allowed to first consolidate their integration positions 
before making commitments under EPAs.
208
 
The guidelines did not lay down the configuration of the negotiating groups. These 
groups would be constituted after the categories of subjects that would be agreed on with the 
EU.
209
 The membership of the negotiating groups would be based on a decision by the ACP 
taking into account the best interests of all ACP States. 
 The ACP decided that the negotiating groups would be based on regional groupings 
but advocated for the ACP Secretariat to act as a coordinating mechanism between the 
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The EC Green Paper of 1996 proposed negotiating the EPAs with regional groupings of the 
ACP countries.
211
  It acknowledged that the ACP group is neither an economic or legal entity 
but was established in the framework of the European and ACP relations for purely historical 
reasons.
212
   The ACP countries have divergent economic interest based on their level of 
economic development and appeal to foreign investment.
213
  The Green paper questioned 
whether the ACP was a suitable partner for negotiating the agreements and lay down four 
considerations for the partnership. It acknowledged the fact that largely, the decision on the 
negotiating forum lay with the ACP countries whose choice was going to be a reflection of 
their willingness to step up the ACP cooperation, define their common objectives and 
enhance their negotiating skills.
214
  The paper acknowledged that the divergence of the group 
called for a different approach to cooperation so as to take into account the needs of countries 
that were at lower levels of development. The objective of the CPA would change not only 
the content of the cooperation framework, but also the geographical configuration of the 
parties to the parties under the framework.
215
 It acknowledged that there was need to devise 




The new arrangement contemplated negotiation of the agreements in four tiers. These 
would have either been region to region FTAs, bilateral FTAs with willing ACP countries, 
non-reciprocal preferences with LDCs, or graduation into GSPs for the countries that were 
not willing to negotiate EPAs.
217
  
The EU lay down its preference of geographical configuration principles for ACP 
countries. It envisaged negotiating the EPAs with main regional groups of ACP countries and 
introduced the concept of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs). The EU 
regarded regional integration as a stepping stone towards full liberalisation and integration of 
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the ACP countries into the global arena.
218
  The EU concurred with the CPA position on the 
need to use the EPAs as a means foster the smooth integration of the ACP into the world 
economy. 
 The EC adopted proposed directives for the negotiation of EPAs in 2002.
219
 These 
directives were termed as the negotiating mandate and they gave the EC the framework 




In terms of the ACP- EPA negotiating groups, the EU’s proposal to negotiate with 
regional groups of countries was problematic because of the ACP countries’ overlapping 
membership of regional groupings. The EU encouraged the ACP countries to negotiate in 
configurations of their choice. At the time of the formation of these groups, the African 
continent was still facing leadership challenges which resulted in minimal coordination 
among the negotiating groups.
221
 The African countries then proceeded to form four groups. 
The configuration of these groups with the exception of the EAC does not match the 
configuration of the existing RECs. 
The ACP States decided the group under which they would negotiate the EPAs. 
222
 
States which belonged to more than one REC could only align themselves with one 
negotiating group. This has resulted in the apparent fragmentation of the RECs where 
negotiation of EPAs is concerned. 
The joint ACP-EU Ministerial Trade Committee meeting that was held in St Lucia in 
February 2003 was concluded with outstanding issues on EPA negotiations.
223
 The Ministers 
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failed to agree on the modalities for concluding phase 1 of the EPA negotiations. On one 
hand, the ACP advocated for coming up with a conclusive agreement at the end of phase 1, 
but the EU was not in agreement with this proposal. Secondly, there was no agreement on the 
parties to be signatory to the EPAs, whether they would be States or an all ACP group.
224
 
The AU Commission was later given the mandate to monitor, coordinate and 
harmonise the EPA negotiations. The AU Ministers of Trade called for coherence in the 
positions taken by the negotiating groups.
225
 The Commission directed that EPA negotiating 
groups were to compare the texts of the IEPAs before concluding them. 
226
The AU further 
called on the EU to respect the existing African integration and regionalisation efforts and not 
to encourage divergences in the IEPAs.
227
 
(b) IEPA Negotiations 
The EU obtained a second waiver from the GATT contracting Parties for the continuation of 
granting of preferences which was to expire on 31 December 2007.
228
  As the expiry date was 
approaching, it was clear that the negotiation for full EPAs would not be possible before the 
expiry of the waiver.  This was due to the fact that there was lack of preparation on the part of 
the ACP regional groupings.  
The EU then resolved to split the negotiations into two so as to have interim EPAs 
covering trade in goods and later on comprehensive EPAs would be concluded after the 
interim EPAs were in place.
229
 The countries that would not have initialled the IEPAs by the 
time the waiver expired would be eligible to access the European Market under the GSPs and 
the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative for LDCs.
230
 
 Negotiations moved from an All-ACP group to regional groupings which further went 
to country level as the 2007 deadline was approaching. As a way to get the EPAs in place 
before the deadline, the EC made offers to both regional groupings and individual countries. 
The IEPAs were negotiated with a view to beating the deadline of the expiry of the waiver.
231
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The EPA negotiations have been characterised by tensions on both sides.
232
 There 
were conflicts in terms of content of the EPAs and the parties were unable to reach a common 
understanding and approach on the new trade arrangements in terms of the development and 
regionalism aspects of the agreements. 
233
 
The ACP countries have claimed that the EU bullied their way into getting them to 
signing IEPAs before agreeing on contentious issues. The ACP States have claimed that they 
had no option but to enter into the IEPAs rather than risk losing market access to the EU.
234
 
The stance of the EU on EPAs is that they will foster development through trade 
liberalisation.
235
 On the other hand, ACP countries see EPAs as an opportunity for 
development through the use of regional integration and trade liberalisation as only some of 
the elements. 
236
The main interest of the ACP countries is the assurance of financial support 
to curb supply side constraints to build up the markets in the ACP region. This has been a 
point for departure between the parties and has escalated the tensions throughout the 
negotiation process.
237
 The EU maintained that the issue of development financing would be 




African countries grouped themselves into five negotiating groups. There are two 
EPA negotiating groups in the SADC region. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and Mozambique are negotiating under the SADC EPA group. The other six 
counties namely DRC, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe are 
negotiating an EPA under the ESA group which contains other COMESA member States.
239
 
Regardless of outstanding issues in the negotiating process, the parties entered into 
IEPAs with plans of concluding full EPAs.  
The IEPAs that have come out of these negotiations are different. It has been stated 
that no clear pattern can be ascertained among them and that there is no clear indication that 
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poorer countries have been given more flexible periods of adjustment than the richer ones.
240
 
There are differences in the content of the trade liberalisation schedules.  This difference has 
been attributed to the negotiating capacities of the respective countries. 
241
 
Countries entered these negotiations as groups, however, their respective tariff 
liberalisation schedules and exclusion baskets are different.  These liberalisation schedules 
are negotiated at country and not group level and do not contain the same baskets if goods 
that are excluded from tariff liberalisation.
242
   
Negotiation of full EPAs will cover issues not covered in the IEPAs like trade in 
services, and other trade related issues like competition law, investment, government 
procurement, intellectual property, environmental issues among others.
243
 
(c) IEPAs in SADC 
Due to their overlapping membership of RECs, countries had to decide under which grouping 
they would negotiate the EPAs.   
(i)The SADC IEPA 
EPA negotiations were launched in Windhoek in 2004 and the Minister of Trade of Botswana 




 When the negotiating process began, SADC had problems bringing together all the 
fifteen member States to come up with a common stand.
245
 The REC was split into several 




 SADC member States that belonged to other RECs could not negotiate the EPAs 
under all the regional groupings to which they belonged. They had to choose one EPA 
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 Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe chose to 
negotiate under the ESA group; Tanzania, which is also a member of COMESA, chose to 
negotiate under the EAC group; DRC chose to negotiate under the CEMAC group; The rest 
of the countries Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola 
negotiated under the SADC group; South Africa did not fall under the CPA regime because it 
already accessed the EU market under the TDCA which came into force in 2004.
248
 
Negotiations were stalled and restarted in 2007 after the SADC group proposed that 
the EU consider including South Africa in the negotiations which did not fall under the CPA 
regime but traded with the EU under the TDCA.   
 Progress on negotiations was slow due to disagreements on trade related issues and 
trade in services. The parties disagreed on the extent and schedules of trade liberalisation, and 
protection of infant industries from foreign competition.
249
 SADC did not want to conclude   
binding commitments on these issues and agreed to negotiate on competition policy and 
investment when the right negotiating capacity had been developed in the region.  
The SADC IEPA was initialled in 2009 by Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia and Swaziland. Namibia made reservations and raised some issues regarding the 
IEPAs.
250
 This will be discussed further under challenges. 
  The IEPA objectives include poverty eradication through trade partnership; promotion 
of regional integration among the SADC EPA States and their eventual integration into the 
global economy in conformity with their political choices and development priorities.
251
 The 
parties to the Agreement are to conduct their activities with the aim of achieving sustainable 
development in the SADC region.
252
 The Agreement is to promote commercial and economic 
relations between the parties in conformity with WTO law and support implementation of the 
SADC Trade Protocol while liberalising trade between the EU and SADC EPA States.
253
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 The IEPA recognises the importance of supporting regional integration and provides 
that the pace and content of regional integration shall be determined by the SADC EPA 
States in exercise of their sovereignty.
254
  
The aim of trade cooperation is the enhancement of trade in goods between the IEPA 
parties through trade liberalisation, proper implementation of rules of origin and eventual 
improvement of the SADC EPA States’ capacity to trade.
255
  
Article 19 establishes an FTA between the parties and takes into account the principle 
of asymmetry in the implementation of trade liberalisation obligations by the parties. This 
means that the tariff liberalisation schedules will vary depending on the development levels 
of the States. 
Article 23 contains the standstill clause which provides that import and export tariffs 
that are applied to goods traded between the IEPA Parties at the time of entry into force of the 
IEPA shall not be altered at a later stage. This is one of the issues of contention that has 
emerged in the negotiating process and shall be discussed in greater detail under challenges. 
Products originating from the SADC EPA States shall have duty free and quota free 
access to the EU except for those that have been excluded.
256
 Goods originating from the EU 
shall be subject to the various tariff schedules of the SADC EPA States. On entry into the 
SADC region, EU imports shall not be subject to any further taxation and where they are re-
exported from the SADC EPA territory and the tax collected shall be refunded because the 
goods would then be subject to import duty in the importing country.
257
 
The parties shall cooperate in customs and trade facilitation with the aim of ensuring 
implementation of the Agreement.
258
 
The SADC EPA States shall have a five year transition period to bring their customs 
and trade facilitation procedures into conformity with their obligations under the IEPA.
259
 
The harmonisation of customs procedures at regional level shall be encouraged but the 
modalities of doing this shall be determined by each party.
260
 This provision gives SADC 
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member States the option of liberalising tariffs applicable to EU imports at either national or 
regional level. 
The IEPA parties agreed to continue with negotiation of comprehensive EPAs in 
2008. The SADC EPA States include Botswana, Lesotho Swaziland and Mozambique and 
leave out Namibia and South Africa who may join in the negotiation process subject to 
notifying the SADC IEPA parties.
261
 The current negotiations cover trade in services, 
competition, investment and government procurement.
262
 
With the exception of development cooperation under the CPA, any inconsistency 
between the two Agreements shall be resolved in favour of the SADC IEPA.
263
 
 The Agreement was to enter into force when signed, ratified or approved in 
accordance with the relevant constitutional procedures of the parties. The EC passed the EU 
Council Regulation 1528/2007 December 2007 which granted the SADC EPA States duty 
free market access to the EU.
264
 SADC EPA States initialled the IEPA in 2007. 
265
 Namibia 
initialled the IEPA and entered reservations which contended that there were contentious 
issues that needed to be resolved prior to their initialling of the EPA.
266
 
The Agreement shall be valid in perpetuity unless it is denounced by the parties.
267
 
Subject to the negotiations towards a comprehensive EPA, the IEPA shall be subject to 
review every five years and any of the parties may propose amendment to the Agreement.
268
 
Tariff liberalisation schedules 
EU shall liberalise 100 per cent of tariffs on imports from SADC EPA countries with 
transition periods of liberalisation of tariffs on sugar and rice imports to the EU market from 
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The BNLS shall liberalise 86 per cent of its tariffs on goods,
270
  44 tariff lines on 
sensitive products are to be liberalised by 2015 and three more tariff lines shall be liberalised 
by 2018.
271
 The tariff liberalisation schedules are similar to those under the TDCA.
272
  
Mozambique was to liberalise 80.5 per cent of goods at the initialling stage and 100 




Tariffs were maintained on agricultural products and some processed agricultural products. 
These goods include fish, beef, fruit nuts, vegetables, cut flowers, coffee and 
Sugar.
274
 This was done in order to protect infant industries.
275
 
Rules of origin 
Goods are eligible for preferential market access if they originate from either the EU or 
SADC EPA States. The rules of origin form part of the IEPA and are currently being 
negotiated with a view to reaching workable and simplified RoO.  However, this will be a 
complex venture taking into account the fact that the group comprises countries that belong to 
more than one REC which have different RoO. 
(ii) The ESA IEPA 
The group is worth mentioning because some of the SADC members are negotiating an EPA 
under this group. The ESA IEPA has been implemented since 14 May 2012 by Mauritius, 
Madagascar, Mozambique and Seychelles. 
276
These countries will open up their markets 
gradually over a 15 year period. It is the first among the IEPAs in Africa to be implemented. 
3.5 CHALLENGES AND CONTENTIOUS ISSUES 
The challenges in the EPA negotiations apply to both the SADC region and ACP States in 
general. They relate to the limited capacity of ACP and SADC States in the preparation, 
negotiation, implementation and adjustment of the ACP and SADC countries to the 
reciprocal granting of preferences under the IEPAs.  
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With regard to preparation for negotiations, article 35 of the CPA puts the onus of 
ensuring that regional integration is upheld on the SADC States. There was lack of 
preparedness to negotiate the EPAs and the SADC IEPA States’ focus was more on 
preserving market access than on the regional integration efforts.
277
  SADC was able to agree 
on the main modalities of the negotiations. However, countries had to come up with their 
own market access schedules prior to which they were to carry out sustainability impact 
assessment of the EPAs on their economies.
278
 This has been equated to the failure to address 
the development issues on the part of the negotiators because the resulting IEPAs do not fully 
address the development issues in the region.
279
 
The contentious issues regarding the IEPA were raised by Namibia when it initialled the 
IEPA because of the impact the issues may have in regional integration.
280
  The EC said the 
issues would be addressed after the IEPA was signed and if the IEPA members shared 
national concerns. 
281
 This led to the formation of the ANSA group which included Angola, 
Namibia and South Africa which pushed  for the resolution of  some of the following issues 
in the IEPA which  poses challenges to regional integration - 
Trade liberalisation: the CPA, which is the legal basis for EPA negotiation requires 
ACP and SADC States to grant 80 per cent of EU products duty free access within a fifteen 
year period. African countries called for a more flexible implementation period because trade 
liberalisation entails revenue losses especially for LDCs.
282
 SADC member States would 
have to adjust their economies to make do without import tariffs as a source of revenue. The 
gradual removal of tariffs has been symbolic of the integration process in SADC so either 
way, member States will also incur revenue losses from trade liberalisation in SADC. 
However, since SADC members import more from the EU than from the SADC region, the 
tariff cuts on EU imports will entail more national revenue losses. In light of this, SADC 
member States called for a more flexible approach to be taken by the EC in the EPA 
negotiations regarding implementation of trade liberalisation. The EC acknowledged the need 
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for flexibility and undertook to incorporate changes to address the SADC proposals in EPA 
negotiations and in the texts of the full EPAs.
283
   
The MFN clause which requires SADC EPA States to grant the EU the same 
preferences they would grant to another party that they enter into a trade Agreement has been 
criticised for reducing the policy space of SADC States.
284
 For example, if the EPA members 
were to enter into a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with China, they would have to 
offer the same preferences under the PTA to the EU. The EU has been accused of trying to 
retain its position as Africa’s most important trading partner but the EU has maintained that 
the MFN clause is based on fairness and non-discrimination.
285
 
The requirement for the complete removal of export restrictions and duties on 
products from SADC to the EU will entail revenue losses because Member States use export 
duties as a source of revenue and for protection of domestic markets.
286
 This might also have 
an impact on food security. Most countries in SADC are agrarian economies. States put 
restrictions on exports of food items for example Malawi and Mozambique put restrictions on 
the export of maize.
287
 The removal of export restrictions and duties on food items like maize 
would make it easier to for farmers to export maize which is a staple food in most countries 
and this may eventually lead to a reduction on food reserves and increase in food prices. 




The implementation of the standstill clause: SADC applied tariffs are lower than the 
bound rates under WTO. ACP States have argued that the standstill clause is contrary to 
WTO obligations under which Contracting Parties are given the leeway to adjust their tariffs 
subject to WTO rules as long as they do not exceed their bound tariffs.
289
  The EC has argued 




The issue of free circulation of goods originating from the EU once they gain entry into 
the EPA region has to be resolved before the CU is launched. This undermines regional 
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integration and does not take into account the fact that SADC will proceed to a CU with an 
applicable CET.  
A clear picture that emerges from the trend of negotiations is that regional integration is 
not such a high priority under the IEPAs. States are advancing their national interests in 
negotiating the EPAs. One then ought to look at the monitoring and implementation 
institutions that have been established by the SADC Treaty and examine the extent to which 
they are pushing the regional integration agenda. 
According to the findings of a survey carried out by the African Trade Policy Centre, the 
SADC Secretariat has limited human and financial capacity to negotiate the EPAs.
291
 There 
were insufficient resources to train relevant stakeholders in the EPA negotiating process. 
Furthermore, even though the CPA makes provision for training of ACP negotiators, the EC 
funds are difficult to access.
292
 There still remains a need to address the capacity constraints 
at the regional level with regard to EPA negotiations. 
The IEPAs, in their current form and issues that they have brought about regarding 
implementation, do raise questions about their compatibility with the regional integration 
agenda in SADC. This matter will be addressed in chapter four.  
Efforts to prioritise regional integration and development are being made at the ACP 
level. At the meeting of ACP States held in Brussels in 2012, the Kenyan delegate stated that 
focus should be on concluding the substance of the EPAs and not meeting deadlines.
293
 There 
is indeed a need to agree on the substance of the contentious issues before concluding the 




The WTO recognised the need to treat developing countries differently and to not expect 
them to reciprocate the trade preferences given to them which are commensurate to their 
economic and development needs. The EU and Africa trade relationship has evolved over the 
years. It has transformed from a donor recipient relationship to a partnership which has 
resulted in the IEPAs while negotiation of comprehensive EPAs is ongoing. 
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The configuration of the EPA negotiating groups was decided by the ACP States. 
They do not tally with the configuration of the existing RECs because the States are members 
of more than one REC.  The resulting IEPAs from these configurations have different tariff 
liberalisation schedules which might have an impact on progression of regional integration in 
SADC.  
Regional integration is in the best interest of the ACP States but the trend in progress 
of negotiations shows that regional integration has not been a key element under 
consideration by the ACP States when entering into these agreements. National interests 
seem to take precedence over regional plans. 
In light of the challenges that have been met in negotiating the IEPAs, the region 
ought to have a more unified position for negotiating the EPAs. The SADC institutions ought 
to ensure that there is coherence in the negotiations if the objectives of the SADC treaty are 
to be achieved. Furthermore, there is need to build human capacity for negotiations and the 
EC ought to honour its undertaking under the IEPA to build negotiating capacity in the ACP 






















CHAPTER 4 - COMPATIBILITY OF EPAS WITH THE REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION AGENDA IN SADC 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The immediate effect of the EPA negotiations was the splitting of SADC into four 
negotiating groups: the SADC, ESA, TDCA and the EAC groups. These groups have resulted 
in the signing of IEPAs which have different tariff liberalisation schedules. This is contrary to 
Article 29 of the SADC Trade Protocol which calls for cooperation and coordination of 
policies between member states in their trade relations with third parties. 
The chapter discusses the impacts the configuration of the EPA negotiating groups 
may have on market integration in SADC by highlighting the objectives, progress and 
challenges of regional economic integration under the SADC Treaty and CPA. 
 The Chapter is divided into three main parts that seek to answer the main research 
questions set out by this dissertation and focuses on the SADC IEPA.  Although the ultimate 
impact of the configuration of the EPAs is yet to be seen, this Chapter argues that the 
configuration of the IEPAs may be a big stumbling block to progress in regional integration 
in SADC and may disrupt the progression of SAD  from an FTA to a CU.  
4.2 DO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CPA COMPLEMENT THE SADC TREATY? 
 (a) The SADC Treaty 
The SADC common agenda seeks to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and 
socioeconomic development with the ultimate objective of poverty eradication in SADC. In 
the area of trade, it calls for cooperation and harmonisation of trade policies through market 
integration. Member States are to harmonise their political and socio economic policies and 
plans and participate fully in the implementation of plans and projects of SADC.
295
 Member 
States are to refrain from taking measures that are likely to jeopardise sustenance of 
principles and achievement of objectives and programmes under the SADC Treaty.
296
  
The RIDSP set the pace for the achievement of these objectives through market 
integration. The region is currently an FTA and has postponed the launch of a CU which 
awaits the development of a CET. 
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 (b) The CPA objectives  
The ultimate objective of the CPA is that of poverty eradication in the ACP States and their 
eventual incorporation into the global economy.
297
 The CPA focuses on economic and trade 
cooperation and development cooperation within a political dimension.
298
  
The trade cooperation is based on two principles: the use of regional integration as an 




The partnership created by the CPA in trade for development incorporates issues of 
market access and aid for trade
300
.  The economic and trade cooperation is supposed to build 
on regional integration initiatives of the ACP States.
301
 The partnership shall be implemented 
in full conformity with the WTO rules.
302
  
 The objectives of the two treaties are complementary. They have the same ultimate 
goal of poverty eradication in the region with the eventual integration of the region into the 
global economy.  Article 35 of the CPA emphasises the importance of regional integration as 
an instrument for the inclusion of the ACP States into the world economy. However, it is not 
clear which, among the objectives takes precedence over the other: support for regional 
integration or integration of ACP countries into the global economy.  
The slight divergence in the wording of the objectives of the CPA and SADC Treaty 
shows divergent objectives between the two legal instruments. While the SADC treaty has 
regional integration as an end, the CPA regards it as a means to an end.
303
 The EU and SADC 
share a common vision of regional integration is an object of the EPAs.
304
 However, it is 
questionable whether the CPA parties shared the same understanding of how integration 
should be promoted.  The point of divergence comes up on the implementation of the 
objectives of the two treaties. 
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 Implementation of objectives under the SADC Treaty and the CPA 
The SADC Treaty trade objectives prioritise market integration of the member States.  
Under the CPA, economic and trade cooperation is implemented through the EPAs.      
The EU advocates for open regionalism EPAs aimed at opening up the economies of the 
SADC States.
305
  The focus of the SADC IEPA is not on the regional integration in SADC, 
but on trade liberalisation between the parties to the CPA. It does make provision for the 
promotion of regional integration according to the priorities of the SADC IEPA States. It is 
therefore up to the SADC EPA States to prioritise their interests if they are to be taken into 
account in the trade relationship. 
The question that follows is: if this is a partnership agreement, which of the parties 
has the onus of ensuring that market integration is prioritised in SADC and not undermined? 
It is trite in the law of Treaties that the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda applies.
306
 The 
doctrine provides that parties to a Treaty are bound by the Treaty obligations which are to be 
performed in good faith.  
 SADC States have the onus of prioritising regional integration initiatives and the EU, 
as a partner, has a duty to respect the priorities of the SADC EPA States. This has not been 
the case as SADC States have not prioritised regional integration initiatives in EPA 
negotiations and   this has resulted in the IEPAs which do not seem to prioritise regional 
integration. 
 The EC has been blam d for fragmenting the SADC region as evidenced by the 
configuration of the IEPAs in the SADC region. The Commission has always stated that it 
has no offensive interest in the ACP markets.
307
 Some authors  are of the view that the EC 
cannot term its actions as based on pure benevolence, the  truth is that States, always almost 
act in their own national interests and this also applies to the EC.
308
 The EC is more focused 
on concluding WTO compatible agreements and not about supporting the pan African 
movement which is aimed at building solidarity of the African region.
309
 Regional integration 
would lead to harmonisation of policies at regional level which is a step towards integration 
at the continental level. 
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  It has been stated that although the EU has a good development policy agenda, it 
ultimately has its own interests to address among which is the widening of markets of EU 
products which will be beneficial to their producers.
310
 
Gerhard Erasmus puts forward the following thesis – 
.  “It will, however, be a mistake to view SADC as a tightly consolidated and 
effective legal arrangement which will now be disrupted by the SADC-EPA. 
[…]. There was no sinister EC plan to divide and rule Africa through the 




So at the end of the day, the EU is not entirely to blame for the potential disintegrating effects 
of the SADC IEPA. SADC member States chose their EPA negotiating fora. To promote 
regional integration, SADC as a REC should be on the forefront in ensuring that the EPAs do 
not undermine regional integration. 
What will the economic impact of IEPAs in their current configuration be? 
Many ACP States felt that the timetable for conclusion of the IEPAs was rushed and the 
content of the IEPAs would have a negative impact on their economies.
312
 The EPAs are 
about trade creation and promotion of the competiveness of the SADC region in trade. 
However, economists have projected that the surge of European products into the 
SADC region may bring more economic losses than gains to the region.  There is likelihood 
that trade diversion will occur by around 58 per cent.
313
  
  It has been stated that full reciprocity of trade liberalisation shall be costly for Africa 
in terms revenue losses from tariff liberalisation and adjustment costs ensuing from the 
revenue losses that will result from the removal of import tariffs which are a source of 
income for many States.
314
 The gains that have been attained from free market access by the 




 Ibid at 6.  
312
 Adrian Flint ‘ The end of a Special Relationship? The New EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements’  in 
Review of the African Political Economy 79 at 85. Available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03056240902863595.  
313
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Trade and Development Report 2006 (2006)  193. 
314
 Stephen Karingi Rémi Lang Nassim Oulmane et al Economic and Welfare Impacts of the EU-Africa 
Economic Partnership Agreements available at 














SADC States may be undermined by the trade diversion that may come about as a result of 
the EU imports into the region.
315
  
The EPAs have been criticised for taking a neo-liberalist approach that seeks to 
sustain neo-colonialism or bring in new dimensions of imperialism and ‘lock in’ neo 
liberalism within SADC. 
316
  Neo liberalism calls for minimal State intervention in the 
economy.
317
 This is being done through the reduction of the policy space available to member 
States to develop effective policies that will spur economic development.
318
 The conclusion 
of comprehensive EPAs which cover other trade related issues like competition law may 
complicate the process of regional integration in SADC by undermining the coherence of 
policies within the region and restricting the ability of diversification of the SADC 
economies.
319
  Progression of regional integration in SADC is already being hindered by the 
lack of political will and capacity of member States to implement their obligations under the 
Trade Protocol. 
A survey carried out by UNCTAD suggests that the EPAs will stifle the policy space 
in which the ACP States and SADC have to address trade related issues in the region. States 
will be bound by EPA obligations. When they do gain momentum to speed up the integration 
process, SADC EPA States will have to take into account EPA obligations in harmonising 
their trade policies. This might accelerate integration into the global economy, but there is 
likelihood that SADC market integration may be negatively affected. 
The EC is of the view that IEPAs will facilitate the development of IEPA regions and 
their integration into the global economy.
320
  The Taubira report states otherwise and 
condemns the EPAs for being anti-developmental and a threat to food security to the ACP 
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4.3. DOES THE CONFIGURATION OF THE SADC IEPA COUNTER MARKET 
INTEGRATION IN SADC? 
The EPAs in SADC are among one of the issues that affected the progression of the SADC 
FTA to a CU in 2010.
322
 The Configuration of the IEPAs may pose a challenge to market 
integration through the implementation of the different tariff liberalisation schedules under 
the IEPAs and the application of the rules of origin. 
The main reason that has been cited for the breaking up of the region into different 
groupings is that of trying to resolve the issue of multiplicity of membership of RECs.
323
 
The initialling of the IEPAs is not problematic per se; the main problem is the 
implementation of the IEPA in light of regional integration. The following are the 
problematic areas that may arise regarding implementation.  
(a) Potential conflict areas with the regional integration agenda 
The SADC IEPA is not a major threat to regional integration in SADC in its current 
state as an FTA.  Member States still apply tariffs on imports at national level and decide on 
their applicable tariff rates so long as they do not exceed their bound tariffs under the GATT. 
The challenge that member States may face hinges on their capacity to fulfil obligations 
under both the SADC trade regime and the IEPAs. 
The following are some of the problematic areas that may pose challenges to the 
progress of integration. 
(i) Trade liberalisation in SADC and the SADC EU IEPA 
Members of a customs territory ought to have a common set of tariffs applicable to most 
imports for an FTA to become a CU. SADC member States are still gradually liberalising 
their tariff schedules in and are in the process of harmonising tariffs in order to come up with 
a CET and it is expected that the CU will be launched in 2013. 
 Under the SADC IEPA, member States have different tariff liberalisation schedules 
for imports from the EU. The IEPA calls for 86% liberalisation of goods by value by the 
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 The difference in liberalisation schedules might raise complications when the SADC 
FTA progresses to a CU.  One CU member cannot have zero tariffs on EU imports by virtue 
of an EPA and another member cannot apply tariffs to the very same import that has duty free 
importation in a territory of another CU member. 
 The fact that some member States will have liberalised tariffs applicable to products 
originating from the EU or have different exclusion baskets might prolong the process of 
formulating the CET.  For example, SADC member States that still apply tariffs to EU 
products which may have duty free importation status in the SADC IEPA States, may still 
want to retain the tariffs applicable to the EU products. SADC IEPA member States on the 
other hand will be bound by the tariff lines under the IEPA. This issue may be resolved 
through the harmonisation of trade liberalisation time frames under the IEPA and SADC.  
(ii) Rules of origin 
Under the SADC IEPA, EU products that are eligible for duty free access into the SADC 
region are those that wholly originate from the EU or have undergone sufficient working in 
the Community.
325
 In the EU, goods that originate wholly from the SADC IEPA States or 
have undergone sufficient working in the region are eligible for duty free market access in the 
EU. The principle of cumulation under which products incorporate materials originating from 
either of the two regions qualifies the products as wholly originating from either region.
326
 
Goods are eligible for duty free status on importation in either region, upon proof of origin. In 
this case, EU imports into the SADC EPA region shall be imported duty free where it is 
proved that they originate from the EU. 
 In SADC, goods are eligible for preferential treatment on proof that they were wholly 
produced in a SADC member State, or that if not wholly obtained in a member State, 
underwent sufficient working or processing in the member state.
327
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The CU requires the member States to have a CET applicable to imports into the 
region. The existence of the FTA under the SADC IEPA means that goods from the EU will 
have duty free access into the SADC EPA States. The CET is supposed to be applicable to all 
imports to the CU. This will become an issue when goods that have duty free status under the 
EPA are imported into the CU in which some member States will not have liberalised tariffs 
on that particular EU import.   
(iii) The standstill Clause 
 The SADC IEPA standstill clause precludes members from raising tariffs above the ones 
agreed on with the EU.
328
  This means that the CU will have to take into account the tariff 
lines agreed on by the EPA States. This might unnecessarily inhibit the rest of the SADC 
members in formulating a CET of their choice which may still be compatible with their 
obligations under the GATT.  
The standstill clause cannot be used to prevent SADC from applying a CET that is 
higher than the tariffs agreed on in the SADC EPA. The GATT does not preclude contracting 
Parties from raising tariffs on the formation of a CU, article XXIV makes provision for 
negotiations to achieve satisfactory adjustment for affected parties where tariffs are raised in 
the formation of a CU.
329
 
Will the SADC IEPA strengthen regional integration in SADC? 
During negotiations, the SADC IEPA States raised the issue that the configuration was not 
complementary to SADC and SACU integration process.
330
   The SADC group asked for a 
halt in the negotiations to take South Africa on board. The EU accepted the proposal. South 
Africa said that it joined the negotiation so as not to further divide the region.
331
 
Despite joining in the negotiations, South Africa still accesses the EU market through 
the TDCA. This is problematic for SACU as a region to which South Africa is a member. 
According to the SACU agreement, no member State may unilaterally negotiate a trade 
agreement since the member States apply a CET to goods from third States. The TDCA 
complicated the SACU trade scheme which has its own tariff schedules for third States and 
rules of origin applicable to imports into the region. One positive feature of the SADC IEPA 
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is that it aligns its objectives and implementation of tariff liberalisation with that of the 
TDCA which is a step towards the harmonisation of trade policies in the region.
332
 
When it comes to implementation of the EPAs, the configuration may have a 
fragmenting effect on the SADC region if the configuration remains the same.
333
  
The pressure by the EU to complete negotiations is causing undue pressure on the 
ACP States which are still highly underdeveloped. It has been suggested that it would be 
more helpful if the regional groupings came up with a common position and work on their 
regional development before opening up their markets to the EU.
334
Due to the differences in 
levels of development, adjustment costs on the part of the SADC States will be more than 
those that the EU will incur. It is important for the SADC States to strengthen their industrial 
base and promote intra-regional before opening up their markets. However, under article 
XXIV, the reasonable time frame for formation of an FTA is ten years with room for 
extension given by the contracting Parties. If SADC were to focus more on its own market 
integration before implementing the EPAs, the implementation of the EPAs might take a 
longer time. However, this issue surrounding f EPA compatibility with article XXIV and the 




If the SADC IEPA becomes a full EPA it may have a destabilising effect on 
integration in the region.
336
 The development of the manufacturing industry might be 
tampered with due to the new partnership agreements and may impact on alternative 
development strategies available to the countries. 
337
 One of the objectives of market 
integration is the industrialisation of SADC. The competition from European products might 
stifle the growth domestic industries. 
 The negotiation of full EPAs includes trade in services and other trade related issues. 
The conclusion of these EPAs will leave very little policy space for the SADC region to come 
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up with its own regional policies. The member States will be bound by the obligations 
undertaken in the EPAs. 
 From the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the current configuration of the SADC 
IEPA might have a negative impact on market integration concerning trade in goods. 
4.4. IS THE CPA FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE THE TRIPARTITE 
FTA? 
The plans of SADC to merge with COMESA and EAC to form the TFTA may be 
complicated with the existence of the EPAs in their current configurations in the respective 
regions. 
Article 36 of the CPA makes provision for flexibility in the negotiation of EPAs. The 
flexibility covers provision of a sufficient transitional period, a degree of asymmetry in terms 
of timetable for tariff dismantlement, and the final product coverage.  The flexibility in article 
36 is narrow in scope and only comes into play once the negotiations are already in process. 
So in essence, it applies to the current configuration of the negotiation of the EPAs. 
 Article 95 of the CPA provides for the review of the CPA every five years of its 
twenty year duration.  The party seeking consideration of review of a provision is to notify 
the other party of the issue of concern with a possibility of amendment of the agreement. So 
far there have been two reviews. 
 The EPA negotiations are supposed to be flexible enough to take into account the 
level of development and the socio economic impact that the EPAs may have on the ACP 
region.
338
 The negotiations are also supposed to take into account the capacity of the ACP 
States to adjust to the effects implementation of the EPAs. 
 Members of the TFTA can negotiate for changes in the IEPAs to tally with the on-
going regional integration agenda.  This can be done through the review process under article 
95 of the CPA.  
A brief look at the past reviews and what changes have been effected in trade related 
provisions will show the extent of flexibility of the CPA to address issues of interest to the 
parties. 
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The 2005 review 
The amendments that were made after the review were mainly political and hinged on 
security issues. The review also reflected the change in development policy of the EU. 
339
 
The 2010 review 
The second review was aimed at preserving the relevance of the partnership and to adapt the 
Agreement to changes that had taken place in the international and EU-ACP relations.
340
 As 
regards trade, the agreement now recognises the important role of regional integration in the 
ACP States and amendments were made to Title II which covers economic and trade 
partnership. The original text had initially only designated member States as actors of 
cooperation.
341
 The 2010 revision identifies ACP regional organisations and non-state actors 
as actors in the relationship.
342
 The AU is now recognised as a key player in the relationship 
and is now legible to receive funding from the EDF. However, the key players in the EPA 
negotiations still remain member States. 
 The new trade chapter recognises the role of the EPAs as tools for the gradual 
integration of the ACP States into the global economy.
343
 The review was considered as a 




 Negotiation of the EPAs indicates that there exists a power imbalance in the EU-
SADC trade relationship.  The ACP States claim to have been bullied by the EU into signing 
the interim EPAs to beat the December 2007 expiry deadline. The ACP States had initially 
wanted the EU to extend the deadline for the conclusion of the EPAs because they felt that 
the timetable set for the conclusion of the EPAs was too short and would have an impact on 
their economies.
345
 However, the EU refused to extend the cut-off date of December 2007 on 
which the Lomé preferences were to cease. In defence of the EC position, the Trade 
Commissioner at that time stated that the deadline was not a creation of the EC but a waiver 
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given by the WTO.
346
  The CPA makes provision for negotiation for EPAs with States that 
consider themselves in a position to do so.
347
 
The ACP States expected the EU to consider alternative possibilities for those States that 
could not negotiate the EPAs but emphasis was put on conclusion of the EPAs despite the 
availability of alternatives under the EBA initiative for LDCs and GSPs for non-LDC 
States.
348
 Some authors are of the view that the ACP States had a right to state that the EC 
acted in bad faith.
349
However, as much as this seemed unfair to the ACP States, they knew 
that the deadline of the waiver was coming. They ought to have started organising themselves 
for the change in the trade partnership.   
The ACP States ought to come up with a common negotiating base. This would have 
helped address the issues that have arisen with the IEPAs. If they had a common agenda, they 
would have managed to negotiate similar terms regardless of the different fora used for 
negotiating the EPAs. 
The negotiations were not as flexible as the ACP States wanted them to be. The EU stood 
its ground and the deadline was not extended.   
What does the CPA revision entail for SADC? 
The negotiations for full EPAs are still under way in the ESA and SADC groups. The CPA 
text still recognises the member States of the region as actors to the agreements.   
 The mere recognition of the AU and regional organisations as actors in the 
relationship is not of much significance if the negotiations are still proceeding in the current 
SADC and ESA EPA co figurations. This does not do much to support the regional 
integration that is being pursued in SADC. 
A new article 30 was introduced to strengthen the capacity of regional integration 
institutions and the AU. In response to the perceived adverse impacts of the EPAs on regional 
integration, the mandate of the Joint Ministerial Council was expanded to include the 
monitoring of EPA negotiations and implementation.
350
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The CPA provides for the support of inter-regional and intra-regional cooperation 
involving one or more ACP regional organisations even at continental level.
351
  This 
provision was included after the 2010 review.  
One would assume that the review would take into account the proposed TFTA that 
SADC is planning on establishing in conjunction with COMESA, and EAC.
352
 The word 
‘support’ is rather vague. It is yet to be seen how this support shall be implemented in 
addition to the financing of the RECs’ activities.  
The second review was done after the proposal of the TFTA. One would assume that 
since SADC was planning on merging with COMESA and EAC, the review and subsequent 
amendment would reflect the role of the RECs as active partners in the Agreement. 
Does the CPA really support regional integration? 
There are various references in the CPA which talk about either ‘recognising the importance 
of regional integration’ or ‘supporting regional integration’. The configuration of the IEPA 
groups has brought about division rather than deeper integration. The CPA is now viewed as 
not very relevant for regional integration but may play an important role in the financial 
support of the RECs through the EDF. 
353
  The CPA reviews have not brought significant 
changes in terms of supporting regional integration. 
The SADC position on EPA negotiations 
The problem of incompatibility of the EPA agenda with the SADC regional integration 
comes about as a result of weak monitoring and implementation mechanisms in the REC. 
The SADC treaty established the SADC summit and vested policy and decision 
making powers in it. The Summit should play a role in ensuring coherence in negotiating 
positions. The Treaty also gave the Secretariat power to ensure the implementation of 
regional integration initiatives. 
  It has been argued that the EU is not wholly to blame for the apparent fragmentation 
of the region as seen from the EPA configuration.
354
  SADC is not a tightly consolidated legal 
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arrangement. It has about thirty legal instruments many of which are not being implemented 
due to lack of a strong monitoring and implementation mechanism.
355
   
Furthermore, although SADC has a legal basis in form of the SADC treaty, the 
implementation of obligations by member States has not been to the letter of the Treaty. 
Member States have not fully implemented their obligations under the SAC trade legal 
instruments. If there existed cohesion in national interests of member States in SADC, the 
problem of IEPAs incompatibility with market integration would not have arisen. The 
member States would have refrained from making undertakings that would counter the 
market integration. 
The SADC member States are legally bound by the SADC Treaty as signatories to it. 
They are to refrain from entering into agreements that undermine the regional integration 
agenda. The SADC treaty preceded the IEPA. It is also worth mentioning that the SACU 
Treaty of 1910 also precedes the IEPA. SADC member States should have given priority to 
the regional integration objectives under these treaties in the negotiation of the IEPAs in 
order to uphold regional integration in SADC. 
The IEPA does not preclude the members from entering into other trade agreements 
so long as they do not undermine the obligations under the IEPA.
356
 This provision is 
problematic. It is obvious that the establishment of the SADC CU will have an impact on 
FTAs under IEPAs. The CET to be applied may be higher or lower than the tariff lines that 
have been agreed on in the SADC IEPA. For example SADC member States may agree on a 
higher CET than the tariff lines that have been agreed on in the SADC IEPA. The issue of 
which tariff regime will take precedence over the other ought to be addressed before the 
EPAs are concluded. This is why the issue of flexibility should take into account the 
possibility of changing the configuration of the EPAs if both partners to the CPA are to stand 
to benefit from the trade relationship.  
Partnership for development 
The right to development still remains an aspiration and not a legally enforceable right 
clouded with vagueness as to who the duty bearers of the right are and how the right can be 
enforced.
357
  The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) 
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focuses on the duties of States at both the national and international level. Article 3 of the 
UNDRD puts the responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions 
favourable to the realisation of the right to development. States are to cooperate to ensure 
development and eliminate obstacles to development.
358
 
The EU has stated time and again that its actions are aimed at development of the 
ACP and SADC region and that the relationship is based on partnership and equality 
however, the power relationship still remains one sided with the EU emerging the stronger of 
the two parties.
359
 This is reflected in the negotiation of the IEPAs and the reviews of the 
CPA. As much as the text of the CPA makes room for flexibility, the implementation of 
article 95 to lays in the capacity of the parties to negotiate for change and prioritising regional 
integration.   
As to whether the CPA and the SADC IEPA leave room for flexibility, the answer is 
yes. However, implementation of its provisions shows that there is need for SADC to build 
on its capacity to negotiate for what is workable for the region. In addition to this, the EU 
ought to take into account the development needs of the SADC IEPA States which lack 
capacity to effectively negotiate for their development needs. 
Possible fora for addressing IEPA issues 
SADC could use various fora to ensure that the regional integration agenda is not undermined 
by the EPAs. 
The Summit of the Heads of State could come up with a common position that will be 
reflected in the negotiation process. The member States ought to consider what their priorities 
are regarding development and market integration.  
There is a need for establishment of a monitoring and implementation mechanism to 
ensure that member States implement FTA obligations. SADC, on the establishment of the 
FTA left the monitoring of the implementation of the tariff phase down in member States to 
the Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment Directorate of SADC.
360
 However, actual 
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implementation lies with the member States. It was envisaged that the SADC Secretariat 
would establish a Trade Compliance and Monitoring Mechanism for monitoring the 
implementation of the FTA.
361
 It is high time that SADC took a step towards the 
establishment of this mechanism. This might help in ensuring that States comply with their 
market integration obligations under SADC.  
The AU could be used as a forum for coming up with common African positions. The 
AU called on African member States negotiators to safeguard the interests of regional 
integration in EPA negotiation.
362
 It further called for the EPA groups to coordinate their 
negotiating positions and for EPAs to take into account emerging issues.
363
 
 Member States of the TFTA suggested that the AU should negotiate a common 
African position on EPAs with the EU and then let every African country enter the EU’s EPA 
framework on the basis of the common position.
364
  It is of interest to note that there has not 
been much discussion for the reconfiguration of the EPA groups. One would assume that in 
the event of the TFTA being established, plans would also be underway to align the EPA 
groups to the TFTA configuration. 
 The next CPA review is in 2015. This could be used as a forum to address the issue of 
the problems that have come about due to the configuration of the EPAs.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The CPA and the SADC treaty complement each other and have the same ultimate goal of 
poverty eradication and the gradual integration of the SADC and ACP member States into the 
global economy. The point of divergence comes up on the implementation of their respective 
objectives. Whereas the SADC Treaty uses market integration to achieve the objectives of the 
treaty with aim of developing the region and build its capacity to integrate into the global 
economy. The CPA advocates for open regionalism in which it uses EPAs to foster the 
integration of SADC into the global economy. 
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The configuration of the EPAs in SADC may be a challenge to the progression of 
market integration in SADC. It will be difficult to align the implementation of the EPAs 
when SADC becomes a CU especially where tariff liberalisation and rules of origin are 
concerned. 
The proposed T-FTA entails the existence of three EPAs in the FTA. It would be 
counterproductive for all the three to be retained when the TFTA is established.  It would be 
less costly if there would be one EPA. Although this will not be an easy process, due to the 
different levels of progress in regional integration, the TFTA members could consider 
working towards harmonisation of their respective EPA obligations. 
The CPA makes room for negotiation of matters of interest to the parties. SADC 
ought to come up with a strong implementation and monitoring mechanism if the regional 
integration agenda is to move forward.  After solidifying their negotiating base, they can 
negotiate for changes in the CPA that will not undermine regional integration. Although there 
still remains a power imbalance in the EU- SADC relationship, if SADC were to have a 
common negotiating position and member States uphold their regional obligations, the 























CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
The impact of the configuration of the IEPAs in SADC is yet to be seen but there is 
likelihood that they might pose challenges to regional integration and the progression of the 
SADC FTA to CU. 
5.1 REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS A TOOL FOR DEVELOPMENT 
The importance of regional integration cannot be overemphasised in the multilateral trading 
system. Both developed and developing States have used economic integration to further 
advance their economies and increase their wealth for the welfare of their people.  
 Southern Africa is no exception.  SADC was formed in 1992 to coordinate and 
harmonise policies between member States of the region with the aim of poverty eradication 
and the eventual integration of SADC into the global economy.  
 The SADC common agenda on trade seeks to integrate markets of member States 
through tariff liberalisation and it is implementing the market integration model of regional 
integration. SADC has its own rules of origin and tariff liberalisation schedules. 
 In its current state as an FTA, SADC still faces challenges of implementation of 
market integration obligations by member States which has delayed progression of the FTA 
to a CU. This has been attributed to weak monitoring and implementation mechanisms that 
would ensure compliance with obligations undertaken by member States. However, the main 
obstacle that remains is the actual implementation by member States of their obligations 
under the Treaty. In its efforts of further integration in accordance with Treaty establishing 
the African economic Community, the region agreed to merge with COMESA and EAC to 
form the TFTA. The discussions are still underway and the TFTA is yet to be implemented. 
5.2 THE EU AS A DEVELOPMENT PARTNER OF SADC 
The trade relationship between the EU and SADC has shifted from a donor-recipient 
relationship to one of partnership for development. The coming into operation of the CPA 
symbolised a shift in the trade relationship from non-reciprocity in granting of preferential 
market access of goods to a relationship characterised by reciprocity. The EPA negotiations 
seek to implement the new trade relationship. 














The CPA trade objectives complement those of the SADC Treaty and they both aim to reduce 
poverty in the SADC States and incorporate them into the global economy. 
 The point of divergence is the implementation of the respective Treaties. The SADC 
Treaty calls for market integration of member States while the CPA provides for EPA 
negotiations with the aim of establishing FTAs with member States which consider 
themselves in a position to do so.  
There are two IEPAs in the SADC region.  These are the SADC IEPA and the ESA 
IEPA   which have different tariff liberalisation schedules and exclusion baskets for goods.    
5.4 CONFIGURATION OF THE SADC IEPA AND ITS IMPACT ON MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
(a) Economic impact 
The ultimate goal of the SADC IEPA is to integrate the SADC IEPA States into the global 
economy and it takes cognisance of the fact that regional integration plays an important role 
in the SADC region. The IEPA is supposed to build on the regional integration agenda. 
 The SADC IEPA members have different tariff liberalisation schedules under the 
IEPA. The implementation of the SADC IEPA may undermine regional integration and have 
an adverse economic impact through trade diversion and trade deflection. Studies show that 
the EPAs may undermine the economic integration that aims to build the industrial base and 
production capacity of goods in SADC. 
(b) Legal implications 
The CPA and the SADC treaty complement each other to a certain extent but the point of 
divergence comes in the implementation of the objectives. 
Whereas the SADC treaty calls for deepening economic integration in the region 
through market integration, the CPA calls for open integration through the EPAs.  
The EPA will bring in complication in the regional integration process in the 















The RoO applicable to the SADC IEPA differ from those that are applicable to SADC. The 
SADC RoO grant goods that originate from the SADC region duty free market access to a 
market of another SADC member State.  
Under the SADC IEPA goods that are eligible for duty free market access are those 
that originate from the SADC IEPA States and the EU. When the CET is formulated, its 
application to EU imports by States that are not members of the SADC EPA might contradict 
with the tariffs applicable under the EPA. This is because EU products will already have duty 
free access to the SADC EPA States.  
(ii) The standstill clause in the SADC IEPA 
The standstill clause precludes SADC IEPA member States from raising tariffs above the 
rates applicable under the IEPA. This will become an unnecessary restraint on the EPA States 
when the region is formulating the CET for the CU. The CET that might be agreed on may be 
higher than tariffs applicable under the EPA. The raising of tariffs is allowed under the 
GATT on formation of CU.  
 (iii) Tariff liberalisation schedules 
The SADC IEPA member States have different tariff liberalisation schedules and different 
exclusion baskets. This may complicate the formulation of the CET which calls for a uniform 
application of tariffs to imports.  The fact that the member States have different sensitive 
products in their exclusion baskets might further complicate the formulation of the CET 
which will slow down the progression of SADC to a CU. 
(iv)The MFN Clause 
The MFN clause unnecessarily restrains SADC member States from negotiating partnerships 
which have better conditions than those under the IEPA. This interferes with the policy space 
of the SADC States. 
Recommendation 
As the SADC IEPA members proceed with the negotiation of a full EPA, they ought to take 
into account the market liberalisation that is being pursued in the region. They need to come 
up with common positions and strive to harmonise their undertakings that are made under the 














tread carefully to ensure that they do not unnecessarily reduce their policy space for making 
decisions on matters like competition law for the region. 
5.5 FLEXIBILITY OF THE CPA AND IEPA TO INCORPORATE THE TFTA 
The CPA makes provision for flexibility in the negotiation of EPAs regarding product 
coverage and liberalisation schedules. This applies to existing IEPAs. 
 The provision for flexibility in the negotiation process is rather narrow since it only 
covers product coverage and liberalisation schedules.  
Article 95 provides for review of the CPA every five years to adjust the partnership to 
changes in the international trade regime and changes that occur in the partnership.   The 
CPA has undergone two reviews so far to preserve the relevance of the trade relationship.  
The first review did not do much to change the economic and trade cooperation. It 
dealt political cooperation issues, financing and security issues. The second review 
recognised the importance of regional integration and designated regional trade organisations 
as actors in the partnership.  
 The CPA makes room for flexibility in the EPA negotiations and amendment of the 
Agreement.  The main challenge has been the power imbalance between the EU and the 
SADC and ACP States in general. However, the halting of the SADC IEPA negotiations to 
enable the inclusion of South Africa is an indication that there exists flexibility that might 
allow for changes in the configuration of the EPA groups. 
Recommendation 
SADC should use the flexibilities under the CPA to negotiate for amendments to the CPA 
that will take into account the proposed establishment of the TFTA. 
5.6 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
There following general cross cutting issues in both the implementation of the market 
integration in SADC and the EPA negotiations should be addressed - 
(a) Strengthening of monitoring and implementation mechanisms 
Member States undermine the regional integration agenda through their failure to implement 
obligations under the SADC Treaty and by entering into agreements that undermine regional 
integration. Member States should uphold their regional integration obligations and align 














 The SADC Secretariat should work on operationalisation of a mechanism to ensure 
the implementation of the regional integration obligations by member States. It is the very 
same member States that wear different hats in different fora and end up making undertakings 
to implement different and sometimes contradictory obligations to their obligations under the 
SADC treaty. 
(b) Cohesion of negotiating fronts 
The divergence in negotiation outcomes is a result of the lack of cohesion of policies and 
priorities by member States. The fact that the region has limited capacity in terms of human 
resource personnel to negotiate the EPAs can be addressed by having a common negotiating 
stance in the negotiating fora. 
5.7 WAY FORWARD 
Regional integration ought to move forward in SADC as it advantageous to the region and 
would help build its industrial base so as to enable it to compete globally. SADC member 
States should uphold their regional obligations and not undermine market integration.  
The monitoring and compliance mechanism would only work if States feel obliged to 
uphold their obligations. The on-going negotiations of the EPAs are flexible enough to 
incorporate issues that will advance regional integration. All it takes is to have a common 
negotiating position. If the EPAs are aligned to the regional integration agenda, they could be 
used as tools for development as they were initially intended to be and complement the 
market integration being pursued for development of SADC. To quote the sentiments of some 
EU States in a letter to Baroness Ashton - 
 ‘..We have much to do to ensure that EPAs genuinely live up to the goals formulated 
in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. We therefore need to ensure that EPAs will 
actively support regional integration and contribute to a regulatory framework that 
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